Truthful resource management in wireless ad hoc networks by Cai, Jianfeng
TRUTHFUL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
IN WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS
A Dissertation
by
JIANFENG CAI
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
August 2005
Major Subject: Computer Science
TRUTHFUL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN WIRELESS AD HOC
NETWORKS
A Dissertation
by
JIANFENG CAI
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved by:
Co-Chairs of Committee, Udo Pooch
Riccardo Bettati
Committee Members, Jianer Chen
Michael Longnecker
Rabi N. Mahapatra
Head of Department, Valerie E. Taylor
August 2005
Major Subject: Computer Science
iii
ABSTRACT
Truthful Resource Management in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. (August 2005)
Jianfeng Cai, B.E., National University of Defense Technology
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Udo Pooch
Dr. Riccardo Bettati
In wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), cooperation cannot be an im-
plicit assumption anymore. Each profit-oriented network node has the intention to
be selfish due to limited resource possession. In this dissertation, we investigate the
truthful resource management that induces network nodes to reveal true information
and stimulate cooperation.
We propose the Transmission Power Recursive Auction Mechanism routing pro-
tocol (TEAM) and the Truthful Topology Control mechanism (TRUECON) to cope
with the selfish intention and achieve resource efficiency in a non-cooperative envi-
ronment. We prove both are strategy-proof and have some theoretic bounds on the
performance. Compared with the existing routing protocols and topology control al-
gorithms, TEAM and TRUECON are more efficient when dealing with the selfishness
in MANETs.
We conduct a study on anonymity enhancement in MANETs by reducing trans-
mission power of network nodes. A routing protocol - Whisper is presented. Simu-
lation results show that it has desirable properties in terms of anonymity and power
efficiency.
iv
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Wireless mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) technology enables users to form a com-
munication network on the fly. In a MANET, any portable device with a radio com-
ponent can communicate with others without the aid of pre-deployed infrastructures.
“Communicating anytime and anywhere” is always a fascinating idea for people.
Due to the limited resource possession, especially the energy, of mobile nodes,
how to manage the resource usage efficiently is very important. Many efforts [1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7] have been made on energy-efficient routing. Adjusting the transmission
power to induce a power-efficient network topology is also studied extensively in
[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
Underneath these researches lies a common assumption that every node in a
MANET always does exactly what it is supposed to do. Ironically, as mobile com-
munication technologies bring the freedom of staying in touch, they also bring the
freedom of breaking rules. Network nodes in MANETs are usually managed by differ-
ent profit-oriented entities, such as people belonging to different groups or companies.
As a result they follow their own interests instead of any pre-defined procedures.
Selfish behaviors are inevitable in MANETs due to the lack of a central authority
and the limited amount of critical resources. Any protocol cannot assume that all
network nodes strictly follow its guidelines. Researchers have tackled the selfishness
from two approaches. One is to treat selfish nodes as a security threat and try to
identify and punish them. Efforts in [16, 17, 18, 19] belong to this category. However,
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2selfish nodes are different from malicious nodes though they may degrade the network
performance like malicious nodes. Selfish nodes are rational in that they are only
interested in maximizing their own benefits rather than attacking others.
Another approach is to stimulate cooperation by creating incentives. Research
works [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] in this category study the economic implication of the
resource management problem.
From the game-theoretic perspective, we can model a network node v as an
independent agent in a game. The preference of v is represented as a utility function
uv. It consists of two parts: one is the cost of a network activity the node participates;
another is the payoff for v by the participation. Without any payment transfer, v has
a non-positive utility when it forwards data packets for other nodes. It is because
it drains its own energy to serve others. Consequently, the best strategy for v is to
refuse any forwarding request and have the maximum utility at 0. Therefore, any
protocol ignoring a node’s selfish intention and treating a MANET as a collaborative
system will fall short to achieve its goals.
Apparently, if we can design a mechanism for network nodes in a MANET and
convince them that following rules of the mechanism can best serve their interests,
collaborations may prevail in such a non-cooperative environment. Such a mecha-
nism is called a strategy-proof mechanism or a truthful mechanism, because any node
cannot trick the mechanism to get an outcome in favor of its own utility.
Designing truthful mechanisms to stimulate collaborations in a non-cooperative
MANET is the motivation of this research. In the last part of this dissertation, we
expand the meaning of being truthful to the protection of user privacy. We conduct
a study on enhancing anonymous communication in MANETs.
3B. Main Contributions
In this dissertation we identify the importance of the incentive of network nodes.
Based on this observation, we design two truthful mechanisms for routing and con-
ducting topology control in MANETs respectively. We also extend the research to
power-efficient user privacy protection. Our main contributions can be classified into
three categories.
• We design the Transmission Power Recursive Auction Mechanism (TEAM)
routing protocol to discover power-efficient paths in a MANET of selfish nodes.
We prove TEAM achieves truthfulness. In term of efficiency, TEAM is an ap-
proximate algorithm. With some conditions, we prove that the power efficiency
along a TEAM path can be bounded within a certain range comparing to the
optimal solution. We show TEAM has a lower message complexity than another
truthful routing protocol – Ad hoc – VCG [22].
• We propose a truthful topology control mechanism - Truthful Topology Con-
trol (TRUECON), which is a pioneering work in MANETs. Inducing network
nodes to reveal their true cost and generate an appropriate topology is a promis-
ing direction for truthful resource management in non-cooperative MANETs.
TRUECON preserves the network connectivity while keeping the node degree
as a constant and reducing the average transmission range significantly. We
demonstrate TRUECON achieves all these objectives along with the truthful-
ness.
We simulate TRUECON with DSR [26] ad hoc routing protocol and evaluate
the system performance by applying various metrics. The result is satisfactory.
• We study enhancing anonymous communication in MANETs by reducing the
4transmission power of network nodes and propose a routing protocol - Whisper.
In certain scenarios, Whisper gives the communication initiator a better chance
to hide among its peer nodes.
C. Dissertation Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Next chapter introduces
the technical background, including game theory, mechanism design, and radio prop-
agation characteristics. The network model we assume throughout our work is also
presented in this chapter.
Chapter III discusses the truthful routing and proposes TEAM protocol in detail.
We prove the truthfulness of the protocol and analyze its efficiency comparing to an
optimal solution.
In Chapter IV, we discuss the design, implementation and evaluation of a truthful
topology control mechanism – TRUECON.
We summarize our contributions and draw conclusions in Chapter V. We also
identify challenges and point out the direction for future work.
In Appendix A, we study anonymous communication in MANETs and propose a
routing protocol – Whisper to enhance anonymity of communication initiators in some
network circumstances. Appendix B presents the simulation data of experiments we
conduct in this dissertation.
5CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
A. Game Theory and Mechanism Design
Game theory [27, 28, 29] is a method to study the conflicts and the behaviors of
players based on the strategy interaction. The objects, which act independently in
a game, are also called agents. In the rest of this dissertation, agent and player are
exchangeable. Each player has its preference, called type, over the outcome of a
game. The type is private information of every player. A type of player i is denoted
as θi ∈ Θi from a set of types Θi. Given an outcome o of a game from a set of outcome
O, the utility of agent i is u(o, θi).
Definition A.1 A strategy si is a plan of actions agent i takes under a specific state
in a game.
An agent has a set of strategies Si. The outcome of a game, o(s1, . . . , sn), depends
on the input of strategies of all the participating agents. Thus if agent i prefers a
strategy si to s
′
i, u(o(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn), θi) ≥ u(o(s1, . . . , s′i, . . . , sn), θi), where si 6= s′i,
si ∈ Si and s′i ∈ Si.
Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) denote the strategy profile of all agents, and the strategy of
every agent except i is represented as s−i = (s, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). Similarly, θ−i
denotes the types of all the agents except i.
A well-known solution concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium [30]
Definition A.2 A strategy profile s(s1, s2, . . . , sn) is in Nash equilibrium if no agent
can switch to another strategy in favor of its own utility while keeping all others’ utility
non-decreasing. Thus u(si(θi), s−i(θ−i), θi) ≥ u(s′i(θi), s−i(θ−i), θi), for all s′i 6= si.
6Please note that Nash equilibrium requires the information of other agents’
strategies.
Definition A.3 A strategy si is a dominant strategy for agent i if ui(si, s−i, θi) ≥
ui(s
′
i, s−i, θ), for all s
′
i 6= si, s′i ∈ Si.
A dominant strategy maximizes the expected utility of agent i, no matter what
strategies other agents play. Comparing to Nash equilibrium, playing dominant
strategies is a more robust solution because it does not have any assumption on
other agents’ strategies. It is observed that in second-price sealed-bid auctions (or
Vickrey auctions [31]), truth-telling is such a dominant strategy for every agent.
Mechanism design, also called Inverse Game Theory, is to design a set of rules
of strategies and game outcomes in order to implement an optimal solution in an
environment of self-interested agents which have their own preferences over different
outcomes. The preference is private information only known by an individual agent.
Chapter 2 in [29] gives a good review on Classic Mechanism Design.
Definition A.4 A social choice function f : Θ1× . . .×Θn → O selects the desirable
outcome f(θ) ∈ O, given a type profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn).
The goal of mechanism design is to implement a solution of the social choice
function in a mechanism despite agent’s self-interest.
Definition A.5 A mechanismM consists of a set of strategies {S1, . . . , Sn} for each
agent and an outcome function g(.) : S1× . . .×Sn → O, thusM = {S1, . . . , Sn, g(.)}.
If in a mechanism M, there is a dominant strategy S∗i (θi) for each agent i,
i = 1, . . . , n and g(S∗i (θi)) = f(θi) for all (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ1 × . . . × Θn, then M
implements the social choice function f(.) and yields a desirable result. Every agent
7only needs to play its dominant strategy and get a maximum expected utility without
any information of others.
If the preference of an agent depends on the choice it makes in a game and the
payment the choice can bring back, then the preference (or the type) can be described
as a quasi-linear utility function.
Definition A.6 A quasi-linear utility function for agent i with type θi is denoted as
u(o, θi) = vi(x, θi)− pi where x is a choice from a set of discrete choices X , and the
payment p is decided by the outcome o.
There are two crucial properties in mechanism design: direct-revelation (DR)
and incentive-compatibility (IC). In a direct-revelation mechanism the only action
each agent can make is to announce its preference to the mechanism. The announced
preference θˆi is based on the true type θi. On the other hand, θˆi could be either true or
false. An incentive-compatible mechanism is a direct-revelation mechanism, in which
agents always reveal their true types. If a mechanism implements truth-revelation
(or truth-telling) as a dominant-strategy for each agent, it is strategy-proof. We also
call a strategy-proof mechanism truthful in the reminder of this dissertation.
There is a family of successful direct-revelation and strategy-proof mechanisms,
VCG mechanisms. VCG mechanisms are named after Vickrey, Clarke and Groves,
who contributed to this mechanism family by their seminal papers [31, 32, 33]. VCG
mechanisms are for problems, in which agents have quasi-linear preferences. Accord-
ing to [34], VCG mechanisms are the only direct-revelation mechanisms, which are
allocation-efficient and strategy-proof.
A well-known mechanism in VCG family is the second-price sealed-bid auction,
in which the best bidder wins and the winner pays the price of the second best bid.
For example, there are two agents, A and B, biding for one item I, which has different
8Table I. CASE ONE: AGENT A TELLS THE TRUTH
agent value bidding price status utility
A 8 8 L 0
B 10 10 W 2
A 8 8 L 0
B 10 12 W 2
A 8 8 L 0
B 10 9 W 2
A 8 8 W 0.5
B 10 7.5 L 0
values for them. Without loss of generality, suppose the value of I for A is 8, VA = 8;
and the value for B is 10, VB = 10. Each of the agents can only bid once. The best
strategy for them is bidding the true value of having I. The utility functions for A
and B are
uA = 8− p
and
uB = 10− p
We show the effects of different strategies B takes in two cases. In case one, A
bids its true value. In case two, A announces a value other than its type. Tables I
and II illustrate the numeric results of the two scenarios. Status L denotes lost and
W means win.
It is observed that only when B announces the true value of its preference, it
achieves a maximum expected utility.
9Table II. CASE TWO: AGENT A LIES
player value bidding price status utility
A 8 9 L 0
B 10 10 W 1
A 8 9 L 0
B 10 12 W 1
A 8 9 L 0
B 10 9.5 W 1
A 8 9 W -0.5
B 10 8.5 L 0
A 8 11 W -2
B 10 10 L 0
A 8 11 L 0
B 10 12 W -1
A 8 11 W -0.5
B 10 8.5 L 0
A 8 11 W 0.5
B 10 7.5 L 0
A 8 7 L 0
B 10 10 W 3
A 8 7 L 0
B 10 12 W 3
A 8 7 L 0
B 10 8.5 W 3
A 8 7 W 1.5
B 10 6.5 L 0
10
Let sB denote the strategy of B telling its true value and s
′
B denote any strategy
as B reporting other values. Thus,
u(sB, θB) ≥ u(s′B, θB), s 6= s′
VCG mechanisms are a family of efficient, and strategy-proof direct-revelation
mechanisms on quasi-linear preference. A quasi-linear utility function consists of two
parts, like
ui(k, pi, θi) = vi(k, θi)− pi
where vi(.) is the value function of agent i and pi is its payment.
We let g(θˆ) be the outcome function in terms of a choice function, k : Θ1× . . .×
Θn → K, and a payment function, ti : Θ1 × . . .×Θn →R, for each agent.
In VCG mechanisms, the outcome function g(θˆ) always decides on a choice k∗
that maximizes the total value. It computes:
k∗ = arg max
k∈K
∑
i
vi(k, θˆi) (2.1)
Then, given a profile of the reported types θˆ = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆn), the payment function
of VCG mechanisms is defined as
ti(θˆ) = hi(θˆ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(k
∗, θˆj) (2.2)
where hi : Θi → R is an arbitrary function over the reported types of all agents
except i. The variety on the selection of function hi(.) produces the diversity of VCG
mechanism family.
11
The utility of an agent i in the VCG is:
ui(θˆi) = vi(k
∗(θˆ), θi)− ti(θˆ) (2.3)
= vi(k
∗(θˆ), θi) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(k
∗(θˆ), θˆj)− hi(θˆ−i) (2.4)
Ignoring the hi(θˆ−i), which is independent of i’s reported value, the goal of agent
i is to solve:
max
[
vi(k
∗(θˆi), θi) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(k
∗(θˆj), θˆj)
]
(2.5)
As in choice function (2.1),
k∗ = arg max
k∈K
∑
i
vi(k, θˆi) (2.6)
= arg max
k∈K
[
vi(k, θˆi) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(k, θˆj)
]
(2.7)
Only when i reports its true value, will the mechanism and i have tuned value
functions to compute. In that case, function (2.7) assures to solve (2.5) so that it
maximizes the result of agent i’s utility function (2.4), whatever other agents’ reported
values.
As incentive-compatible (IC) mechanisms, VCG mechanisms align the utility
functions of individual agents with the goal of a system. Therefore if an agent tells
the truth, the system guarantees to best serve its interests.
VCG mechanisms are able to prevent any single cheater, but cannot achieve
strategy-proofness if collusions can happen.
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Fig. 1. Power efficient relay area of free space model and two-ray ground reflection
model. When a sending node S is at (-1, 0) and a receiving node R is at (1, 0),
a route passing through an intermediate node in the enclosed area consumes
no greater total transmission power than the direct path from S to R.
B. Radio Propagation Models
Due to the characteristics of radio channel propagation models, transferring a packet
may cost less power if it is relayed by multiple intermediate nodes rather than trans-
ferred over a single long-distance hop. In the two-ray ground reflection model, the
power of received signal Pr is expressed as the formula below [35].
Pr =
Pt ×Gt ×Gr × (H2t ×H2r )
d4
(2.8)
In (2.8), d is the distance from the transmitter to the receiver; Pt is the emission
power at the transmitter; Gt and Gr are transmitter and receiver’s antenna gains; Ht
and Hr are the height of the antennas.
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The received power is inversely proportional to d4. If the distance decreases by
a half then the transmission power can reduce to the 1
16
of the original value while
keeping the same Pr. Reducing transmission power can decrease radio interference
and increase network lifetime.
If we use k to represent the constant factors in the formula above, then for the
two-ray ground reflection model we have:
Pr =
Pt × k
d4
(2.9)
There is a threshold for the received signal strength Pr. If Pr is greater than or
equal to a threshold Prthd, the packet is received successfully. Otherwise, the receiver
cannot interpret the packet.
Obviously, with this Prthd, the minimal transmission power, Ptmin, used by a
sender is:
Ptmin =
Prthd × Pt
Pr
(2.10)
Hence, a node is able to compute the minimal emission power Ptmin to reach
another node as long as the receiver measures the received signal strength and reports
the value to the transmitter.
Using α to denote a general exponent of d and K to represent all the constants,
we have:
Ptmin = K × dα, α ∈ [2, 6] (2.11)
In the free space radio propagation model, α equals 2. And α equals 4 for the
two-ray ground reflection model.
Receiving packets also incurs power consumption. Comparing to the transmission
power, the receiving power is small [36]. To simplify the analysis, we ignore the
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receiving power in this dissertation as well as the power consumption on signaling
messages.
Fig. 1 shows the area in which if there is a node to forward packets for a pair
of nodes at coordinate (−1, 0) and (1, 0) respectively, then the two-hop path requires
less total transmission power than a direct transmission.
C. System Model
A wireless ad hoc network can be interpreted as a weighted graph, G(V,E,W ). Net-
work nodes are represented by a set of vertexes V . If node u is within the com-
munication range of node v, there is an edge (u, v) between them. We assume all
nodes are identical and all links are bi-directional. The cost Wu,v on edge (u, v) is the
transmission power Pu,v consumed on the sender side.
We denote a source node as S, which generates and sends out packets, and a
destination node as D. S is the start of a path while D is the end. A path from S to
D is a series of node identifiers, σS,D = {S = σ0, σ1, . . . , D = σL}. L is the number of
hops along the path. du,v is the Euclidean distance between node u and v.
In a routing protocol, we demand each node to advertise its transmission power
in its packets. The receivers will measure the received signal strength and report the
calculated minimum emission power to the sender. Hence the sender can adjust its
sending power level accordingly.
However, due to the irregularity of the radio propagation in the real environment,
the ideal minimum transmission power is hard to get if not nonexistent. Then, in a
real application, this may be implemented as different emission power levels at the
sender side. A sender can choose a transmission power level based on the feedback
from the receiver to achieve better channel quality while saving energy. To simplify
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the analysis, we still use the minimum transmission power in later sections.
So the weight of a path from S to D can be expressed as
WS,D =
L−1∑
i=0
Pσi,σi+1 = K
L−1∑
i=0
dασi,σi+1
Definition C.1 A Minimum Transmission Power (MTP) path is a path from its
source S to its destination D, along which the total transmission power PMTP is not
greater than any other path connecting the same pair of nodes.
We do not demand any positioning services in a network. A node does not have
to know any geographical information. However, every node needs to be able to detect
the direction, from which a packet is received. Using directional antenna technology,
this is achievable.
To encourage collaborations among network nodes in MANETs, we use mone-
tary transfers to create cooperative incentives in a, otherwise, non-cooperative envi-
ronment. We claim there is some virtual currency system, like Nuglets [20], in the
MANETs we conduct our investigations.
There should be a relationship between one unit of payment and one unit of
energy (or power). In this dissertation, we do not give a method to decide the value
of a payment unit. But we believe one unit of virtual money used for paying network
nodes should be able to trade one unit of energy (or power).
For the truthful routing in MANETs (Chapter III), we assume that a secure
payment facility exists in ad hoc networks. Some peer works, like Sprite [37], provide
appropriate evidences for this assumption. If a node promises to forward network
packets, its payment will be determined by the routing protocol. The payment facility
assures to deliver the payment by the right amount securely after a node has really
served.
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There is a finance center (FC), like the Credit Clearance Service (CCS) in [37],
which has an authority to draw a tax from each node and use it to pay service
providers for the public welfare. When a node has a link to the finance center, the
debit and credit transactions will be performed. A source is assumed to be truthful
because it needs the network service to fulfill its own tasks.
The FC can even work off-line while the serving nodes move to it and bring
evidences of services to claim their payment. For example, a school can implement
the finance center because it is easy for it to collect service fees and spend them for
good. We also assume there is no collusion among network nodes and the control
messages are forwarded by each node for free. Every node can be given a certain
amount of initial funding to pay the tax and the communication fees.
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CHAPTER III
TRUTHFUL ROUTING IN MANETS
A. Introduction and Motivation
Limited resource possession is the main motivation for a node to be selfish. Mobile
devices, such as laptops and PDAs, are battery powered. The energy reserve is limited
and cannot be quickly replenished. Therefore they always intend to save energy
for themselves. We can see as long as network nodes are managed by individual
authorities, which are only interested in their own welfare, selfishness is inevitable.
On the other hand, node cooperation is the basis of network services. Serving
for the network functions should not come for free. As the service providers get
compensation in some form for their cost, the intention of cooperating with others is
stimulated.
Game theory [27], in particular, mechanism design gives us a powerful tool to
model cooperative and non-cooperative interactions between different agents. In a
game, an agent has its own preference, called type, which is represented by a utility
function. The type is private information unknown to other agents. A rational agent
has the incentive to maximize its utility while playing a game. In the game theoretic
setting, the network nodes act as the agents in a game.
A truthful mechanism induces, instead of forcing, network nodes to tell truth
and collaborate with each other. We study the effect of mechanism design on routing
and forwarding in MANETs. We believe any routing algorithm needs to take the
selfishness into account, otherwise its performance cannot be assured when dealing
with self-interest oriented MANETs.
We propose a truthful routing protocol - Transmission power rEcursive Auction
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Mechanism (TEAM) protocol for MANETs. With TEAM, we call for auctions in the
route discovery process and design appropriate payment function to cope with selfish
behaviors.
B. Prior Arts
PARO [2] reduces the aggregate transmission power by taking advantage of multi-
hop transmission. It allows a route to be redirected by intermediate nodes. Since the
nodes in ad hoc networks have the intention to be selfish, they may not volunteer
to redirect a path all the time. SPAN [1] elects coordinators to form a forwarding
backbone. Non-coordinators can enter the doze state to save energy. SPAN does not
use adaptive emission power, thus every node keeps a uniform power level as long as
it is on. This may cost more energy than necessary and cause more radio interference.
GAF [7] divides an area into virtual grids. Nodes in the same grid are the
equivalent routers. They shift in three states: active, sleeping and discovering so that
they can forward network traffic in turn. Li, et al. [14] study the relationship between
the transmission range and the connectivity of resulted graphs. They show that
(K+1)-connected graph can be achieved with certain probability when the emission
radius and the node number satisfy some conditions.
In [38], Dorsey calls the protocols, which ignore the fact that a node is willing
to save energy for its own usage, compulsory protocols. In real world, a protocol
may not have the authority to force all nodes to do what they are supposed to do.
In contrast, individual nodes in ad hoc networks are able to manipulate a protocol.
Marti, et al. [16] show that even a small portion of misbehaving nodes can degrade
the network performance dramatically. [17, 18] attack security routing by establish-
ing countermeasure mechanisms against malicious nodes. However, selfish nodes are
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different from malicious nodes because they are rational.
Economic concepts have already been introduced into distributed system research
area [39]. In [20, 21, 38], the collaborations between different nodes are no longer taken
for granted. Instead, some mechanisms are designed to stimulate the cooperative
works. In [20], network services are traded on each hop toward the destination.
Viewing and solving problems in distributed systems from the perspective of
mechanism design is a recent trend [40, 41]. Nisan and Ronen [42] discusses mecha-
nism design and its applications from the algorithmic aspect. Ad hoc-VCG [22] is a
work close to our research. It implements a generalized VCG mechanism in ad hoc
networks in order to achieve the cost-efficiency and truthfulness. It pays intermediate
nodes a premium, which covers the incurred cost. Its payment assures the Individual
Rationality (IC) and the overpayment has a theoretical bound. However the message
overhead of Ad hoc-VCG is high, O(n3), in that it exhausts each possible path to
find the most energy efficient. TEAM [23] improves the power efficiency along a path
while keeping the message complexity low at O(n+L×n) and achieving truthfulness.
C. Truthful Routing Protocol Design for MANETs
1. TEAM Protocol Design
The intuition of TEAM is that it may not find the most energy efficient path, a MTP
path, but through a truthful mechanism it can find an alternative, which approximates
the MTP path. We divide the route discovery into two phases. First, TEAM runs
an AODV-like protocol [43] to find a minimum-hop route from the source S to the
destination D. Initially, S broadcast a route request RREQ into the network. Each
node receiving the RREQ checks whether it is the destination. If it is not, it forwards
the request by broadcasting it again. After the destination node receives the RREQ,
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a route reply message RREP is created and sent out along the backward path. Each
node on the route records the destination node and next hop toward it. As soon
as the source receives the RREP, a minimum-hop path is established and phase two
starts.
Since the energy efficiency along a route is improved in phase two, the longer
each hop in phase one, the bigger improving space we have in phase two. The RREQs
need to be broadcast with maximum power by each intermediate node. To induce
nodes to broadcast in this way, TEAM makes the price of each communication session
flat at M , which is the amount a source needs to pay. All the nodes, chosen in phase
one, share the payment. Thus, each node will receive M
L−1 equally, while L is the
hop count of the path. Only when L decreases, can intermediate nodes increase their
payoffs. The value of M is based on the diameter of a network. We just assume this
value is decided beforehand in a way to make it attractive enough for any forwarding
nodes and affordable for any source nodes.
In phase two, TEAM calls for auctions within each hop on the current path. The
nodes picked in phase one have known their payoffs that will not change no matter
what phase two turns out. Thus these nodes will act correctly in phase two. In
addition, security monitoring methods, such as the Watchdog [16], can be applied
into the network to ensure behavior. Since we assume there is no collusion among
selfish nodes, it is reasonable to believe that a rational node does not want to take
the risk of losing its secured payoff.
Intermediate nodes, which are overhearing the routing messages and within the
communication range of both the upstream and downstream nodes, vi and vi+1, bid
to redirect the path as long as the redirections can reduce power consumption. Each
of those intermediate nodes uses one-hop broadcast messages, as the Hello messages,
to announce the total transmission power spent along a redirected path that goes
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Fig. 2. Route discovery: establish a path through recursive auctions.
22
through it. The cost of a redirecting node is its transmission power for forwarding
packets to its successor. If it reports correctly, the cost cannot be greater than its
announced value. Since we have assumed there is a relationship between payment
and power, we just use them interchangeably.
The best bid, or the minimum transmission power redirected path, wins the
auction. The two end nodes of the hop update their routing tables according to
the auction result. The winner receives a payoff, Pf , which is equal to the second
best bid. By the design of TEAM, the second best bid is the transmission power on
another path from vi to vi+1. This value can cover the cost of the winner (redirector),
if it has reported correctly.
Since each node has a maximum emission power level, and its participation is
voluntary, the cost cannot be arbitrarily high. The finance center draws taxes from
each node to pay for the public affairs. This is reasonable because the network-wide
energy saving is beneficial for each node.
Then,
Pfvj = Pˆvi,vk + Pˆvk,vi+1 (3.1)
vj is the winner of an auction and vk is the node of the second best bid. .
After a redirection ends, another round of auctions starts within the newly redi-
rected hops as long as a power improvement can be achieved. Fig. 2. depicts how a
path is recursively redirected. Please note that in a real-world application, the auction
stop condition may be modified in order to take the receiving energy consumption
into account. But in the following sections we just keep ignoring it to simplify the
analysis. Since the new auctions do not change the payoff of redirectors selected
previously, these nodes have no intention to misbehave from now on.
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TEAM does not establish the final path at once. Intermediate nodes are put
into the cooperative situation one by one through each auction. The advantage of
recursive auctions is that we can prevent cheating in each round. As a node is picked
by the protocol, it secures its payoff by working correctly. Afterwards, it does not
need to lie anymore. This mechanism stimulates cooperation in an environment where
the selfish behavior is almost certain.
2. Truthfulness Analysis of TEAM
The only goal of a rational node is to maximize its utility. So the utility function
decides the behavior of the a rational node.
In TEAM, a redirector vj has a utility function as:
uvj(θˆvj) = −cvj(o(θˆ), θvj +mvj(o(θˆ)) (3.2)
In (3.2), cvj is the cost function of vj. mvj is its payoff. o is the outcome of
a mechanism based on all the announcements θˆ. The mechanism guarantees a non-
negative utility to every participant if it declares truthfully.
The utility function (3.2) is comprised of two parts. One is the cost of coopera-
tion; another is the payoff. The real cost θ is the private information of each node,
so it is unknown to all the other nodes. TEAM mechanism is a direct revelation
mechanism, which demands each node to announce its cost and decide the payoff
based on the received announcements. The auctioneers in each round are the bidders
of the previous round. TEAM decides the payoff to a redirector by using the second-
price sealed-bid auctions, which is a subset of the VCG mechanism family. Therefore,
TEAM follows the truthfulness of VCG mechanisms immediately.
As we mentioned above, a sender includes the transmission power in its packets.
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A receiver calculates and reports the minimum power needed by the sender to reach
it. As an overhearing node vj competes to be the redirector within a hop, it needs to
report to upstream node, vi, the minimum power Pvi,vj and listen to the downstream
node, vi+1, to get the minimum power Pvj ,vi+1. Since the payoff for a redirector is
equal to the second best bid, vj cannot cheat to increase its earning.
vj has three strategies to report Pvi,vj and Pvj ,vi+1 : overstating , understating or
reporting the true value.
Theorem C.1 TEAM protocol is strategy-proof.
Proof First, vj tells the true value of the power used by vi. It is because if it gives a
higher value, it may not be selected as a redirector so that it cannot earn the payoff.
If it is still chosen, it’s payoff does not change because the protocol pays whatever
the second best bidder, without loss of generality, say node vk, reports. If it sends
a lower power value, the communication may fail, which causes it to lose the payoff.
Therefore, vj always tells the truth to the upstream node vi.
Second, vj always announces its transmission power correctly. If it exaggerates
its emission power value, the downstream vi+1 will reply with a higher value. That
may cause vj to lose the competition with others. Suppose it is still selected then its
payoff is the same as it announces a true value. To prevent a false decreased emission
power value, we let vi+1 do a handshake with vj with the calculated minimum power.
If it fails, then vi+1 informs vi. vj will be kicked out because it does not announce
correctly. As a result, if an intermediate node vj wants to be the redirector, it has to
act truthfully.
The values of node vj’s utility function in different cases are shown as (3.3). In
(3.3), vk is the second best bidder; θvj , θˆvj , θˆvk are the true value of vj, the announced
value of vj and the announced value of vk respectively.
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uvj(θˆvj) =

−Pvj ,vi+1 + θˆvk θˆvk > θˆvj = θvj
−Pvj ,vi+1 + θˆvk θˆvk > θˆvj > θvj
0 θˆvj > θˆvk > θvj
0 θˆvk > θvj > θˆvj
(3.3)
When the winner secures its payment, which guarantees to cover its cost, it
does not have to cheat. Thereafter, with the integration of some network monitoring
technology, the system assures all the nodes stay as truth-tellers. Therefore, any node
cannot act strategically to take advantage of the network.
3. Efficiency Analysis of TEAM
Intuitively, TEAM can save power along a multi-hop path. In this section we show
that if the source S and the destination D can communicate directly in one hop with
maximum transmission power, the total power of a TEAM path can be bounded
within dL
2
ePMTP , where L is the hop number of the MTP path.
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From the protocol design, we know if an intermediate node, vj, wants to be
a redirector, the path passing through it must consume less power than the direct
transmission from the upstream node, vi, to the downstream node, vi+1. We use
the free space radio propagation model [35] in our analysis. Consequently the first
redirector must be in a circle area with diameter dvi,vi+1 , which is the Euclidean
distance from vi to vi+1. If there is no such node inside the circle area, TEAM always
prefers a direct transmission. We study TEAM in two cases. One is that there is
no redirector found. The other is that there is at least one redirector chosen by the
protocol.
In the first case (see Fig. 3.), if there is a MTP path from vi to vi+1, different than
the direct path, it must circumvent the circle to reach vi+1. If the MTP has a length
L, the power spent along it cannot be less than the path that L− 1 nodes are evenly
distributed on a half circle from vi to vi+1. We denote the aggregate transmission
power on the MTP path with L hops as PLMTP and that on the ideal path as P
L
min,
then we have
PLMTP ≥ PLmin
PLmin = L
Pthd
K
[(
d2
2
)− d
2
2
cos(
pi
L
)] = L
Pthd
K
d2
2
[1− cos(pi
L
)]
PLMTP ≥ L
Pthd
K
d2
2
[1− cos(pi
L
)] (3.4)
As we know,
PTEAM =
Pthdd
2
K
By substitution,
PTEAM ≤ 2
L(1− cos( pi
L
))
PLMTP (3.5)
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When
L = 3, PTEAM ≤ 1.33PMTP
L = 4, PTEAM ≤ 1.71PMTP
L = 5, PTEAM ≤ 2.09PMTP
L = 6, PTEAM ≤ 2.49PMTP
L = 7, PTEAM ≤ 2.89PMTP
. . .
Now we study the second case in which at least one redirector is found inside the
circle. Because of the design of TEAM and wireless propagation characteristics, the
first redirector is always the node nearest to the middle point of a straight line from
vi to vi+1. If it is also the middle point on the MTP path which has a length L, then
PTEAM ≤ dL
2
ePMTP (3.6)
In Fig. 4., the MTP path from vi to vi+1is {vi, v0i , v1i , v2i , vi+1}. v1i is the first
redirector selected by TEAM. dviV i1 , dv1i vi+1 denote the distances from vi to v
1
i and
from v1i to vi+1. So,
PTEAM ≤ Pthd
K
(d2viV i1 + d
2
v1i vi+1
)
Since there are two hops before and after v1i , then
PMTP ≥ Pthd
K
d2
viv1i
+ d2
v1i vi+1
2
Thus, we have
PTEAM ≤ 2PMTP (3.7)
The length of MTP is 4 in Fig. 4., so (3.6) is true. Actually in this simple topol-
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Fig. 4. There is a TEAM path in the circle with diameter d. The first redirector is
the middle point of the MTP path.
ogy, the two intermediate nodes, v0i and v
2
i , will also be chosen by TEAM recursively.
It is not surprising to see that TEAM finds a path, which is also a MTP path.
Furthermore we prove that the bound (3.6) is held even when the first redirector
is not on the MTP path. For instance, in Fig. 5., the MTP path is {vi, v0i , v1i , v2i , vi+1}.
We choose the node in the middle of the path, which is v1i in this topology. Since the
v0TEAM is the winner of the first auction, the 2-hop path passing through it consumes
less transmission power than any other 2-hop path from vi to vi+1. So we have
(dviv0TEAM )
2 + (dv0TEAMvi+1)
2 ≤ (dviV i1)2 + (dv1i vi+1)2
(3.6) is still true in Fig. 5. When we substitute vi with S and vi+1 with D,
dL
2
ePMTP is the bound of the power efficiency of the TEAM path if S can contact
D directly. We can expect much better performance of TEAM since it is rarely to
see that TEAM just finds a single redirector while the MTP path has multiple hops.
With the increase of node density, there are more alternative paths from S to D.
TEAM finds an approximately optimal path among those alternatives. Along the
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TEAM path, every node is willing to forward network packets and earn its payoff.
Inherited from AODV, the message complexity of TEAM is O(n) in phase one.
In phase two, TEAM calls for the power auctions recursively. The nodes on the final
path are picked one by one, resulting in O(L×n) messages in a stationary network. L
can be the diameter of a graph or, in the worst case, n. Please note that all nodes only
need to broadcast the control messages at full power level in phase one. During the
auctions, they can reduce their transmission power to a lower level, which is enough to
negotiate with neighbors. This is a desirable property because the radio interferences
can be reduced and so is the energy consumed on control messages. In Ad hoc-
VCG[22], cost efficiency is assured with a high message overhead, O(n3). Comparing
to that, TEAM achieves power efficiency with a significantly lower message overhead.
D. Simulation of TEAM and Results
In order to investigate the performance of TEAM in term of power efficiency, we sim-
ulate TEAM in ns-2 network simulator [44] with the wireless extension of Monarch
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Fig. 6. The average ratio of the power on a TEAM path vs. a MTP path at different
node densities.
project [45]. TEAM runs as a routing protocol on the top of IEEE 802.11 MAC
layer, which uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance technique
(CSMA/CA). Before the data transmission, RTS-CTS are exchanged between the
sender and receiver. The data packets are transmitted using dynamic minimum
power, while RTS and CTS are always sent with maximum transmission power.
Every node in our simulations has radio with 2Mbps bandwidth and 250-meter
communication range. We run TEAM in a 300m × 300m area, in which we vary the
node number from 2 to 60. Nodes are stationary and put in the area randomly with
a uniform distribution. Because in phase one all nodes broadcast at the maximum
power, the distance between a pair of adjacent nodes on a phase one path is usually
the same as the maximum communication range. We put a pair of nodes on the
different sides of the network area as the source and destination. In each topology
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the source initiates a route discovery by sending out a RREQ. After two phases, a
power efficient path is established. The aggregate transmission power is measured.
We repeat the experiment 1000 times for each node density.
We also implement the Dijkstra algorithm to find the MTP paths in the same
network topologies as TEAM. The power efficiency ratio, which is the aggregate
transmission power of a TEAM path against its MTP counterpart, is plotted in Fig.
6. The experiment data is listed in Table VI in Appendix B.
It is observed that with the increase of node density, the power efficiency ratio
increases. It means that the TEAM paths shift away farther from the MTP paths.
This is because the more nodes around, the more alternative paths from the source
to the destination. Though TEAM tries to optimize the power efficiency greedily in
each round of phase two auctions, the final result may not be the best. However
it is shown the performance of TEAM is close to the optimal result since the ratio
only increases within a narrow range even when the network topology becomes pretty
dense (e.g. 60 nodes within the simulation area). TEAM can almost find the MTP
path for sure when the network is very sparse.
E. Summary
In wireless ad hoc networks, cooperation among profit-oriented nodes cannot be taken
for granted anymore. Each node is free to follow its own interests. Although re-
searchers have proposed a wealth of energy saving protocols, the selfishness in ad hoc
networks has not been noticed until recently.
Selfish nodes are different from malicious nodes. A selfish node is rational and
not interested in attacking other nodes. Its objective is to maximize its own profit.
Researchers have shown that even a small part of misbehaving nodes can degrade
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the network performance dramatically. Inducing selfish nodes to cooperate by using
payment is a promising approach to tackle the selfishness problem in MANETs. Game
theory, in general, mechanism design, in particular, seems to be the appropriate tool
to cope with interest conflicts.
In this section, we present the Transmission power rEcursive Auction Mechanism
(TEAM) routing protocol to discover a power efficient path, which approximates the
Minimum Transmission Power (MTP) path, in an ad hoc network that consists of
selfish nodes. TEAM pays the service providers according to their contributions.
Recursive auction routing can induce nodes to cooperate with each other and signif-
icantly reduce the message overhead comparing to Ad hoc-VCG. Each node decides
whether to participate the routing service voluntarily in TEAM.
We prove that with an underlying secure payment facility, TEAM is truthful.
No node can lie without decreasing its payoff. If the source and destination can
communicate with each other directly, the performance of TEAM has a theoretical
bound.
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CHAPTER IV
TRUTHFUL TOPOLOGY CONTROL IN MANETS
A. Introduction and Motivation
Topology control technology let network nodes in a MANET adjust their transmission
power in order to reduce their neighbor sets. Fig. 7. shows the topology changes
as a node uses different transmission power. When every node transmits using its
maximum power, the network graph is denoted as G(V,E). The graph derived by
topology control is G′(V,E ′), which is a subgraph of G(V,E), G′(V,E ′) ⊆ G(V,E).
G′ must preserve the connectivity of G. In other words, if a pair of nodes u and v is
connected in G, they should be connected in G′ too.
In G′, the node degree is lower than in G so that a node is expected to have less
neighbors than in G. This is desirable in MANETs because the short the edges, the
less power a node uses to transmit and the smaller area the radio interference can
influence. Furthermore, the wireless network capacity is closely related to the node
degree. The network throughput drops quickly as the network size increases [46, 47].
Comparing the power-efficient routing, topology control is a pro-active method to
reduce power consumption and radio interference.
All the topology control algorithms assume that network nodes cooperate with
each other. Forming a power efficient network topology without degrading the net-
work connectivity needs the collaborations among all the nodes. No existing topol-
ogy control techniques can success without any interaction between different network
nodes.
However, as we discuss in previous chapters, in a MANET the selfish behaviors
are inevitable because of the lack of system regulation power and the resource scarcity.
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Fig. 7. When node u uses different transmission power, its neighbor set changes. In
(a), u transmits with the maximum power. Its communication radius is R.
In (b), u reduces the power and has a radius R′ (R′ < R). As u sets its
communication range as r (r < R′ < R), it can only communicate with the
nearest neighbor v4.
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Rather than ignore the selfish intention, we design a truthful topology control mech-
anism, TRUECON, to stimulate cooperation in order to discover a resource-efficient
network topology.
B. Related Work
Rodoplu and Meng [8] present a distributed algorithm to reduce the transmission
power of each node, while maintaining the minimum energy paths. Li and Halpern
improve the algorithm in [8] by proposing SMECN (small minimum-energy communi-
cation network) [9]. They define a type of edges, 2-redundant edges in term of power
consumption. They claim SMECN preserve the network connectivity and eliminate
all 2-redundant edges. Comparing to Rodoplu and Meng’s algorithm, SMECN termi-
nates faster and achieves the same result. Both of the algorithms need the aid of some
positioning service, such as GPS. In [11], Ramanathan and Rosales-Hain present a
spanning tree algorithm to achieve connected static networks.
In [10, 48], Wattenhofer et al. propose Cone-based Topology Control algorithm
(CBTC), in which a node only needs to know the direction of its neighbors and the
transmission power to reach them. They show that the algorithm can approximate
the optimal solution arbitrarily when the parameter is carefully selected. In CBTC,
a node reduces its transmission power to form a smaller neighborhood than using
its maximum transmission power. They prove that if in each cone not greater than
5pi
6
, there is at least one neighbor for a node, the derived network graph preserve
the connectivity of the original graph. They give three strategies to optimize the
algorithm so that the node degree in the final graph can be further reduced. We
base our truthful topology control algorithm on CBTC. However, we prove that our
algorithm achieves, in MANETs, a crucial property, which CBTC cannot assure,
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truthfulness.
Li et al. [14] study the topology control from the perspective of fault tolerance.
They show that (K+1)-connected graph can be achieved with certain probability
when the transmission radius and the node number satisfy certain conditions.
[46, 47] show, theoretically and practically, the network throughput is expected
to be O( 1√
n
), n is the number of nodes in a network. As a result, while a network
size grows, the throughput keeps dropping. Their works also validate the importance
of topology control technology. If the node degree does not increase as the growth of
the network size, we may expect the network throughput not to fall dramatically.
Another type of topology control technology works on the MAC layer protocol.
Cerpa and Estrin design ASCENT [12], an self-configuring topology control protocol
for sensor networks. ARCENT adaptively elects a few active nodes for the whole
network. The selection of active nodes is based on various parameters, including
neighbor threshold and packet loss rate, etc. Non-active nodes can turn off their
radio for a period and wake up after a sleep timer expires.
PAMAS [13] takes advantage of overhearing. Due to the broadcast characteristic
of radio propagation, a node can overhear the packets, which are not destined to it.
If an overhearing node senses the communication of other nodes and knows it cannot
transmit any packet for a while, it turns off its radio component to save energy.
Among these algorithms, every network node is assumed to collaborate with
others all the time. In another word, the incentive of a node is ignored. If there is no
attraction of the cooperation, we cannot expect the network can function well. For
example, Li et al. [48] have proved that a cone of 5pi
6
is the tight bound of preserving
the network connectivity while reducing the connection degree. So the minimum
number of a node’s neighbor is 3. If a node u establish such a neighbor set with node
v, w, x, each neighbor is critical for u. Without loss of generality, v wants to save
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its energy and stops forwarding packets for u. u may either suffer from an isolation
from the other part of the network or have to increase its power to discover another
neighbor which can replace v. In either way, the topology control scheme is defeated
by the selfish intention.
In [24], Eidenbenz et al. propose a truthful routing protocol COMMIT to cope
with selfish nodes in MANETs. COMMIT prevent a source node from utilizing strate-
gies and achieve a budget control along a power efficient path. However it relies on a
topology control algorithm to restrict the node degree beforehand. If we cannot trust
selfish nodes in routing, can we trust them at other stage? The answer must be No.
As a result, truthful mechanisms are needed at any time when selfish nodes interact
with each other.
C. Truthful Topology Control - Topology Control in Non-Cooperative Environment
A Truthful Topology Control (TTC) mechanism needs to induce nodes to reveal their
true costs and find the optimal solution for network resource management based on
the announced values. Designing a mechanism, in which truthful-telling is the only
dominant strategy, is the goal of Truthful Topology Control.
We present Truthful topology Control algorithm (TRUECON) based on VCG
mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to consider
topology control in a non-cooperative environment.
1. TRUECON - a Truthful Topology Control Algorithm
Like CBTC[10], TRUECON needs to know the direction, from which a message is
received. The direction information can be obtained by using directional antennas.
The communication area of a node is modeled as a Unit Disk Graph(UDG). A node
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u periodically broadcast Hello messages, in which it put its current sending power
value Ps. Upon receiving a Hello message, a node vi measures the received signal
strength Pri and calculates the minimum power Pu,vi needed by u to reach it. Node
vi then replies with an Ack packet, in which it declares Pu,vi as Pˆu,vi . Pˆu,vi may not be
equal to Pu,vi . Node u would decide the price of its neighbors based on the announced
values. If u uses one of its neighbor to send packets to a destination node d, which
is multi-hop away, u needs to pay a price to purchase the forwarding service. Such
a neighbor is called a forwarding neighbor for u. Since a transmitting node knows
the minimum power to reach each of its forwarding neighbors from their feedbacks,
it uses as low power as possible every time.
Because energy is the overwhelming concern for nodes in a MANET, we define
that the price of the network service should represent the amount of power consumed
by a service provider. One unit of payment should be able to buy one unit of power.
The payment can be authenticated by any seller. To simplify the analysis in this
research, we use the power value as a measurement of payments directly. How to
transfer and authenticate the payment is out of the scope of this dissertation. We
include them into the future work.
We define that for node u, each neighbor vi has a direction to some fixed angle.
The direction can be expressed as diru(vi). There is an angle checker function denoted
as Coneα(Neiu). It checks whether in the neighbor set Nu there is a gap with degree
greater than α between a pair of direction-wise adjacent nodes. If there is such a
gap, Coneα(Nu) returns a TRUE. When a FALSE is returned, there is at least one
neighbor in each cone of α around node u.
TRUECON algorithm is shown in Fig. 8. It is the first distributed topology
control algorithm to induce selfish nodes in a MANET to reveal their true costs.
Figure 9 gives an example of running TRUECON algorithm on a network node u.
39
TRUECON(α)
1. Nu =Mu = φ
2. broadcast Hello with full power
3. receive Ack s and record the neighbors into Nu
4. if (Nu == φ)
5. return
6. sort Nu by Pˆu,vi in a non-decreasing order, ∀vi ∈ Nu
7. while(Coneα(Mu) AND Nu 6= φ)
8. vi = DEQUEUE(Nu)
9. Mu =Mu ∪ {vi}
10. if (Nu == φ)
11. return
12. mark all the nodes in Mu and assign their payment as ∞
13. while(( ∃vk ∈Mu, vk is marked and has no payment decided) AND (Nu 6= φ))
14. vj = DEQUEUE(Nu)
15. if (( ∃vl ∈Mu) AND ( not Coneα((Mu − {vl}) ∪ vj)))
16. wvl = Pˆu,vj // wvl is the payment of node vl
17. Mu =Mu ∪ vj
18. if (∃vm ∈Mu, vm is marked, wvm =∞)
19. wvm = Pmax
20. Pu = max(Pˆu,vk ),∀vk ∈Mu, vk is marked
Fig. 8. TRUECON algorithm running on node u.
At first, u broadcasts a Hello message using its maximum power Pmax, and announces
Pmax in the Hello message. A neighbor node vi measures the received signal strength
Pr and calculate the minimum power Pu,vi , by which u can reach vi. vi acknowledges
u by sending back an Ack message, in which it declares a value Pˆu,vi based on Pu,vi .
Pˆu,vi may not equal Pu,vi .
Upon receiving each Ack, u saves the replying node information into the set Nu.
Due to packet collisions and protocol back-off time, the Acks may arrive in arbitrary
order. Without loss of generality, u have Nu = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7} before it runs
line 6 of TRUECON.
At line 6, u sorts the nodes in Nu by their claimed power value Pˆmin. This
value reflects the distance from u to each of its neighbors. Because of the radio
attenuation, the farther a neighbor, the greater its value. If each neighbor declares
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Fig. 9. Example of running TRUECON algorithm on node u.
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its value correctly, then after the sort we have
Nu = {v2, v3, v1, v4, v5, v6, v7}
We define α = 5pi
6
in this example. Li et al. [48] prove that 5pi
6
is a tight bound
for such topology control algorithms that keep only the nearest neighbors without
the knowledge of their geographical locations. We call a 5pi
6
cone a critical cone and
denote the condition of finding at least one neighbor in each critical cone as direction
constraint or d. c.. At line 7− 9, u checks whether there is an angle between a pair
of direction-wise adjacent neighbors greater than 5pi
6
. All the neighbors are checked
in the sorted order, which represents the order of distance.
In the Fig. 9 example, when v1 is added into Mu, ∠v1uv2 = ∠v1uv3 = 5pi6
and ∠v2uv3 = pi3 . Thus, after line 9, Mu contains the closest nodes {v2, v3, v1},
which make function Coneα(Mu) return a FALSE. At this point, TRUECON finds
the same neighbor set as CBTC finds so that TRUECON inherits the connectivity
characteristics of CBTC.
Though we have discovered the nearest neighbor set, which assure the connec-
tivity of a network graph, we need to decide the payment of each node in order to
stimulate their collaborations. Line 12 to 17 of TRUECON algorithm implement a
VCG mechanism in the context of MANET topology control.
Mu increments by one node every time. Without loss of generality, vj is the
claimed closest neighbor among all the node left in Nu. After adding vj, if there exist
a node vk inMu and vk could be excluded so that Coneα(Mu−{vk}∪vj) is a FALSE,
then payoff for vk is equal to vj’s claimed power value Pu,vj . Since vk is already in
Mu and the algorithm processes nodes in a non-decreasing order, Pu,vk ≤ Pu,vj .
In the example of Fig. 9., when node v4 is entered into Mu, it can replace the
v2. Then v4’s claimed power value decides v2’s payment wv2 . In the same way, v5
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determines v1’s payment wv1 and v6 determines v3’s payoff wv3 . After processing v6,
the algorithm reaches the last line. Node u adjusts its transmission power to be the
maximum claimed power value of nodes in Mu. If every node reports correctly, then
at the end of TRUECON, u sets its power Pu as Pu,v1 .
In TRUECON, after a node’s payment is set, it is not changed between two
rounds of Hello messages. To reduce the radio interference caused by sending Hellos,
we can lower the transmission power of Hello messages to the power TRUECON
decides. In a MANET, network nodes can move around. Therefore, between two
consecutive rounds of Hello-Ack exchange, the nearest neighbor set may change.
Then the transmission powers of Hello messages and data packets need to change
accordingly. We prove that no matter what circumstances, any node in the neighbor
set cannot increase its benefit by cheating. We give the formal proof in the next
section.
It is observed that in the example of Fig. 9., every neighbor inMu has a payment
decided before the algorithm ends. However in some cases, the algorithm may stop
before each critical neighbor finds a substitute and sets its payoff. Then the payment
for those neighbors would be equal to the maximum power Pmax.
Fig. 10. gives another example of u running TRUECON. In this case, u processes
its neighbors in an order of v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6 respectively. As it reaches v4, the
direction constraint is satisfied at the first time. It is observed that v3 and v2 are
substitute for each other. Due to the farther distance of v3 to u, d(v3, u) > d(v2, u),
the declared power value of v3 is greater than that of v2, Pˆv3 > Pˆv2 . Then v2’s
payment is chosen by TRUECON as Pˆv3 . Though TRUECON reach v2, v3 before v4,
the payment function cannot start because the direction constraint has not been met
yet.
After running TRUECON, if node u receives packets from one of its forwarding
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Fig. 10. An example of running TRUECON on node u. The outer dash line circle
represents the communication range of u while transmitting at its full power
level. An inner dash line circle represents the minimum communication range
of u when it needs to talk to the neighbor which resides on the circle.
neighbor, say vi, u needs to sign on the payment wvi , which is set beforehand. In
TRUECON, we let the source node pay the price along the path. The endorsement of
a node on the payment of its predecessor is very important. We discuss this issue in
later sections. The monetary transfers are critical to generate cooperative incentives
of rational nodes.
2. Analysis of TRUECON Algorithm
a. TRUECON Preserves the Network Connectivity
We denote the network graph, in which each node transmits using its full power Pmax,
as as GR. After running TRUECON, a network node reduce its transmission power
to P ′, P ′ ≤ P . The derived network graph is denoted as Gr then.
Theorem C.1 If in Gr for each cone not greater than
5pi
6
there is a neighbor node,
Gr preserves the connectivity of GR. Node u and v are connected in Gr if and only if
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they are connected in GR.
Proof The TRUECON works in the same way as CBTC algorithm to discover neigh-
bors. In figure 8, before line 12, TRUECON obtains the same neighbor set for each
node as CBTC. The set of nodes is saved in Mu. After that line, Mu never decreases.
Therefore, the result graph of TRUECON at least contains the graph derived by
CBTC.
Then the network connectivity of TRUECON follows CBTC. Since CBTC pre-
serves the network connectivity, TRUECON preserves the network connectivity too.
b. TRUECON Is Truthful
In addition to a topology control algorithm, TRUECON is a truthful mechanism as
well. The selection function of the mechanism chooses an outcome to minimize the
nominal transmission power of a network node, as long as the direction constraint is
satisfied.
By definition, TRUECON is a direct-revelation mechanism because it lets each
participant announce its private type, which is the minimum transmission power
in this case. The payment is decided based on the declared values. Without loss
of generality, we let node u run TRUECON. The result neighbor set of u is Neiu,
Neiu = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. The utility function of a neighbor vi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is u(vi).
Since we assume every network node has an identical radio component, the link is
symmetric. If node u can communicate to node v using transmission power pu,v, then
v can send packets to u with the same power. So pu,v = pv,u. In TRUECON, when
node vi receives a Hello message from u, it measures the received signal and estimates
the minimum power u can use to reach it. The calculated power value is also what it
needs to send packets to u. This power is the cost for vi to forward packets to u and
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only vi knows its value. As we discussed previously, the declared value Pˆu,vi in Ack
is not necessary to be equal to Pu,vi . Node u needs to decide vi’s payment wvi based
on vi’s and others’ announcements. Hence,
u(vi) = −Pvi(o, Pvi,u) + tvi(Pˆ ) (4.1)
In 4.1, the first part is vi’s cost function representing the power it needs to
consume. So it should be a non-positive value. And the second part is the payment
function of vi.
We observe u(vi) is a quasi-linear function. As Parkes states in [29]:
“The Groves mechanisms are the only allocatively-efficient and strategy-
proof mechanisms for agents with quasi-linear preferences and general
valuation functions, among all direct-revelation mechanisms. ”
The VCG family mechanisms are simply called the Groves mechanisms in [29].
Thus if TRUECON implements a VCG mechanism, we can guarantee the efficiency
and truthfulness of TRUECON.
The selection rule of TRUECON is k : Pv1×Pv2×. . .×Pvn → K and the payment
rule is ti : Pv1 ×Pv2 × . . .×Pvn → R, for each neighbor vi. Node vi reports the power
value Pˆvi,u with its strategies svi , then Pˆvi,u = svi(Pvi,u). Pˆ−vi,u denotes the reported
value of all the neighbor nodes except i.
The selection rule of TRUECON computes:
k∗ = argmin
k∈K
∑
i
Pvi(k, Pˆvi,u), vi ∈ Neiu, with a direction constraint (4.2)
The direction constraint demands that there is no gap greater than 5pi
6
among the
neighbors. k∗ is the choice that minimize the total reported power over the minimal
satisfactory neighbor set.
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The payment rule in TRUECON mechanism is defined as:
tvi(Pˆ ) = hvi(Pˆ−vi,u)−
∑
j 6=i
Pvj(k
∗, Pˆvj ,u) (4.3)
hvi(Pˆ−vi,u) is a function over all the neighbor nodes except vi. With hvi(Pˆ−vi,u),
the payment function tvi picks vi’s first substitute, which has a greater declared power
and keeps the direction constraint satisfied without vi. tvi guarantees the Individual
Rationality (IC) because if a node participates the mechanism and reports correctly,
its expected utility is always non-negative. This is a desirable property for mechanisms
to stimulate participation. Also it shows that a participant is always overpaid by a
payment higher than its cost. However, as we prove later, the overpayment has an
upper bound against the total cost.
By substitution, we have
uvi(Pˆvi) = −Pvi(k∗(Pˆ ), Pvi,u) + tvi(Pˆ ) (4.4)
= −Pvi(k∗(Pˆ ), Pvi,u) + (hvi(Pˆ−vi,u)−
∑
j 6=i
Pvj(k
∗(Pˆ ), Pˆvj ,u)) (4.5)
=
 −Pvi,u −
∑
j 6=i Pvj(k
∗(Pˆ ), Pˆvj ,u) + hvi(Pˆ−vi,u) if vi is selected
0 otherwise
(4.6)
The first two terms are the negative part of the utility function because the
power value represents the cost of each node while serving others. We can ignore the
hi function, as it has nothing to do with vi. If vi wants to maximize its utility, it must
minimize the absolute value of the negative part. Hence, vi want to find a strategy
to solve:
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min
svi∈Svi
[
Pvi(k
∗(Pˆvi,u, Pˆ−vi,u), Pvi,u) +
∑
j 6=i
Pvj(k
∗(Pˆvi,u, Pˆ−vi,u), Pˆvj ,u)
]
(4.7)
= min
svi∈Svi
[
Pvi(k, Pvi,u) +
∑
j 6=i
Pvj(k, Pˆvj ,u)
]
(4.8)
If 4.7 is solved by a single strategy s¯vi , vi can secure its maximum expected utility
no matter what strategies other nodes play.
vi can affect the mechanism outcome, k
∗(Pˆvi,u, Pˆ−vi,u), by reporting Pvi,u as dif-
ferent values. However, only when Pˆvi = Pvi , the mechanism explicitly solve:
min
k∈K
∑
i
(Pˆ ) (4.9)
= min
k∈K
[
Pvi(k, Pˆvi,u) +
∑
j 6=i
Pvj(k, Pˆvj ,u)
]
, with d. c. (4.10)
Since the neighbor’s direction is detected by the node running TRUECON, the
neighbors’ strategies have no influence on the direction constraint. As a result, Truth-
revelation is the dominant strategy of vi, whatever the reported Pˆ−vi,u. Then we prove
the following theorem.
Theorem C.2 TRUECON mechanism is strategy-proof.
In TRUECON, no node can obtain a higher expected utility by cheating as long
as there is another node to be able to replace it. Please note that we assume there
is no collusion among all network nodes. Everyone is on its own when deciding what
strategy to play.
Using the example in Fig. 9., we demonstrate how TRUECON achieve truth-
fulness. Let d denotes the distance between nodes. Then, d(u, v2) < d(u, v3) <
48
d(u, v1) < d(u, v4), < d(u, v5) < d(u, v6) < d(u, v7). When all the node report cor-
rectly, we have Pˆv2,u < Pˆv3,u < Pˆv1,u < Pˆv4,u < Pˆv5,u < Pˆv6,u < Pˆv7,u. By the design
of TRUECON, the minimal set of nodes, which satisfy the direction constraint, in-
cludes v1, v2, v3. The participation of v4 can spare v2 without violation of the direction
constrain. Then the payment of v2 equals to v4’s reported value, Pˆv4,u.
If v2 intentionally reports a value smaller than the true value, Pˆv2,u < Pv2,u and
v4 tells the truth, v2’s payment is not changed because of Pˆv2,u < Pv2,u < Pˆv4,u. The
directions of v2 and v4 are measured by u. u always knows that v4 is a substitute for
v2.
If v2 reports a greater value, Pˆv2,u > Pv2,u and v4 tells the truth, we need to check
two cases. First, Pˆv2,u < Pˆv4,u. Then the payment for v2 is still set as Pˆv4,u. Second, if
v2 overstates too much and makes Pˆv2,u > Pˆv4,u. Then TRUECON selects v4 together
with v1, v3 and assigns v4’s payment as Pˆv2,u. Since when TRUECON terminates, v2
has no assigned payment, u is not going to endorse v2 for anything. That causes v2
not to be paid. The nominated neighbor set v3, v1, v4 satisfies the direction constraint.
Then by Theorem C.1, it preserves the network connectivity for u. Consequently, v2
excludes itself from the forwarding neighbors and loses the payment it could earn.
While v4 is cheating, the truth-revelation is still the best strategy for v2. If v4
reports a Pˆv4,u, which is greater than Pv4,u, and v2 reports correctly, the payment of
v2 is still equal to the announced power value of v4.
When v4 understates by revealing a Pˆv2,u, Pˆv2,u < Pˆv4,u < Pv4,u, and v2 reports
correctly, v2 is still selected and secures a payment, which is greater than its cost.
v4 may want to be chosen by u desperately and declares a very small Pˆv4,u, Pˆv4,u <
Pv2,u = Pˆv2,u < Pv4,u. Then u selects v4 as a forwarding neighbor and pays it Pˆv2 .
The utility of v2 is zero, while that of v4 is a negative value, −Pv4 + Pv2 . In other
words, v4 is punished by being underpaid. This is unacceptable for a rational node.
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Though v2 is not selected, it does not lose anything by keeping its utility as zero.
If v2 makes a counterattack by reporting a smaller Pˆv2,u, Pˆv2,u < Pˆv4,u, its payment
cannot compensate its cost.
Apparently, as v2 is rational, the only strategy it follows is to report correctly all
the time. The same strategy also applies to other nodes selected by TRUECON. No
matter how they report, they cannot make a better expected utility.
TRUECON also has its limit. In some case a node may obtain the ultimate claim
power because of its physical location.
Lemma C.3 In a graph GR, if a node has only one neighbor within a cone of
5
6
pi,
the truthfulness cannot be achieved while preserving the network connectivity.
Proof We assume a truthful mechanism M is available to assure both connectivity
and truthfulness in such a graph. Then truth-revelation is a dominant strategy for v.
Since 5
6
pi is a tight bound for preserving network connectivity, the single neighbors
in a cone of 5pi
6
is critical. In other words, if one of such kind of neighbors refuses to
forward packets, then the network may partitions. Therefore, the neighbor may claim
an arbitrarily high payment in favor of its own utility. As a result, the truthfulness
is broken. This contradicts our assumption.
Obviously, TRUECON achieves limited truthfulness. It cannot assure that those
critical neighbors are always induced to cooperate by paying them the maximum
power value P . Both sides of a trade know that Pmax is a price, which is high enough
to pay off any neighbor’s cost. But a critical neighbor may not be satisfied in that it
is too important to lose. On the other hand, the node choosing neighbors may delay
its payment decision in hope of a new neighbor arriving in the future. Or it may need
to pay a higher price than the maximum power if it is affordable for it. Otherwise, it
just cuts off the critical neighbor and let the network suffer from a partition.
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Lemma C.3 also proves that all the topology control algorithms, which connect
to only closest neighbors have such a limit.
c. Scalability of TRUECON
TRUECON is scalable and adaptive. Though the algorithm in Fig. 8. demands a
node to transmit a Hello message using full power initially, TRUECON can dynam-
ically change the power according to the node density of a network. Intuitively, the
sending power of Hello messages can be confined at the range to the farthest of the
replacement nodes, which decide the payment of the forwarding neighbors. So a node
can keep enough neighbors to acknowledge its Hello messages and avoid unnecessary
packet collisions.
As we expect network nodes are distributed into the coverage area evenly, the
node degree can be denoted as a constant D. To find replacements for D neighbors,
the Acks number equals constant times of degree D. Then with the growth of the
node number n, the number of signaling messages is still O(1).
3. Routing with TRUECON
Each node runs TRUECON locally and adjusts its transmission power to induce a
subgraph, which inherits the connectivity of the original network graph. Except for
the Hello-Ack exchange and dynamic power adjustment, TRUECON does not have
any extra technical requirement so that it is easy to integrate TRUECON with most of
the existing MANET routing protocols, such as AODV [43], DSR [26]. In this section,
we discuss the design of DSR-TRUECON, a DSR routing protocol with TRUECON
enhancement.
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a. DSR-TRUECON — the DSR Enhanced with TRUECON
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol is a reactive routing protocol. In DSR,
each network node has a unique ID. When a source node S wants to communicate
to a destination node D, which is usually multi-hop away from S, it first looks up its
routing table to check whether there is a route from S toD. If there is no such a route,
S initiates a route discovery process by broadcasting a Route Request packet (RREQ)
into its neighborhood. S adds its ID into an address list in the request packet. The
RREQ packet also has a unique request identifier so that each receiver can identify
it. Upon receiving a RREQ, a network node checks whether it is the destination. If
it is not and does not know a path to D, it inserts its ID into the address list and
broadcasts it again. While the RREQ finally reaches the destination D, D replies
with a Route Reply packet (RREP) containing all the accumulated route information
about the intermediate nodes through which the RREQ passes. The RREP is sent
back to S by reversing the path. After S receives a RREP from D a route between
them is established. Data packets will be transferred along this discovered path.
TRUECON requires some adaptations of DSR in order to discover a cost efficient
route while keeping the incentive-compatible property. TRUECON needs to period-
ically broadcast, in one hop, the Hello messages and collect Acknowledges from the
neighborhood. This scheme is supported by most MANET routing protocols. Each
TRUECON-enabled node adjusts its transmission power based on the topology in its
vicinity.
In a MANET, TRUECON requires some payment transfer facility, which guar-
antees to deliver the payment to a service provider securely at right amount. By
such a facility, the payment can only be taken by the designated node. Other nodes
can neither steal nor tamper the payment by all means. We assume there is such an
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DSR-TRUECON()
1. while (true)
2. if (received a Route Request message)
3. if (this is the destination)
4. sum up the total cost and save the RREQ into a table
5. reset time Tr
6. else if (a RREQ with the same Identification received previously)
7. sum up the total cost
8. if (the new RREQ has a lower cost)
9. set the cost for the last node and append my ID
10. broadcast the RREQ
11. else
12. disregard this message
13. else if (receive a Route Reply message)
14. set the payment of the predecessor in the RREP and sign on it
15. send the RREP to the predecessor
16. else if (timer Tr is expired)
17. generate a Route Reply message
18. copy the route with the smallest cost into the RREP
19. set the payment of the predecessor and sign on it
20. send the RREP to the predecessor
Fig. 11. DSR-TRUECON algorithm for processing Route Request and Route Reply
infrastructure deployed in our system.
In DSR-TRUECON, the source node needs to pay the bill of sending packet
along the entire route. Since the source node needs the forwarding service to fulfill
its own functions, it is reasonable to charge it as the service consumer.
Fig. 11 presents the DSR-TRUECON algorithm of processing Route Request
and Route Reply packets. It is shown that DSR-TRUECON implements a distributed
Bellman-Ford algorithm [49] to find a shortest path for a single source in a weighted
graph. We use a two-pass scheme to discover the power-efficient path and transfer
the payment information.
During the route discovery process, when an intermediate node v receives a
RREQ from u, it needs to check the identifier of the packet to determine whether this
RREQ has been seen before. If it is a new packet, v records the cost of its predecessor
u into the received RREQ packet and appends its own ID. The cost is the power
consumption of transmitting packets from u to v. Node v knows u’s cost because u
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declares this value as Pˆu,v when v runs TRUECON beforehand. By Theorem C.2, u
must declare correctly. Then a successor always knows the predecessor’s cost of the
packet transmission. v saves the updated request into a table and broadcasts it into
the network.
If v finds that a same identifier has been received previously, it compares the
total cost in the newly arrived RREQ with the old ones. If the new RREQ has a
lower cost, it travels on a more power-efficient path to reach node v. After updat-
ing corresponding fields, v needs to send out this RREQ by broadcasting it again.
Otherwise, it just disregards the request.
When the destination node D receives a RREQ, D saves it and sets a timer
Tr. The timer is used because D needs to pick the most power-efficient path. The
messages traveling on different paths have different delay to get on the destination.
Every time a new RREQ with the same identifier arrives, D resets the timer Tr.
Finally, when the timer expires, D picks the route with the lowest cost. It records
the route in a RREP packet and set the payment of its predecessor. The payment
information needs to be signed using the private key of the writing node. This is to
prevent the predecessor from manipulating the information to claim more benefit.
The RREP is transmitted to the source node along a reverse path using unicast.
Inside the RREP packet, the intermediate nodes on the route set the payment for
their predecessors one by one. The node next to the source does not need to do
this because the source node is the buyer of the forwarding service. After the RREP
arrives at the source node, the IDs of the intermediate nodes are recorded as well
as their prices. We assume there is no collusion between any selfish nodes and all
the nodes are rational. Then each successor reports the payment of its predecessor
correctly because a biased value cannot bring back any extra benefit to it.
By the design of DSR-TRUECON, the routing protocol always finds a most cost-
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Table III. THE ROUTE REQUEST OPTION FORMAT FOR DSR-TRUECON
Option Type Opt Data Len Identification
Target Address [1]
Cost[0]
Address[1]
Cost[1]
Address[2]
Cost[2]
Address[3]
. . .
Cost[n-1]
Address[n]
Table IV. THE ROUTE REPLY OPTION FORMAT FOR DSR-TRUECON
Option Type Opt Data Len L Reserved
Address[1]
Payment[1]
Address[2]
Payment[2]
Address[3]
. . .
Payment[n-1]
Address[n]
Payment[n]
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efficient (also power-efficient) path in the network. Each node broadcasts a RREQ
at least once. In the worst case, a node needs to transmit a RREQ for every other
node if an incoming RREQ always reveals a more cost-efficient path than the previous
RREQs. Therefore, the message complexity of DSR-TRUE is O(n2), where n is the
number of network nodes.
To accommodate the cost/payment information, the structures of the Route
Request and Route Reply messages need to be expanded. The formats of RREQ and
RREP packets are shown in Table III and Table IV respectively.
b. Case Study of Routing with DSR-TRUECON
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
d
s
Fig. 12. A MANET with 10 nodes. S is the source node, which have packets to send
to the destination node D.
Fig. 12 gives an example of a MANET, in which there are 10 network nodes.
Node S has data packets to send to node D, but it does not know a route to D.
Fig. 13 shows how the DSR protocol discovers a route from S to D in the example
MANET.
S initiates a route discovery by broadcasting a Route Request (RREQ) into
the network with its maximum power. Within the communication range of S are
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node v1, v2, v3, v4, v5 and v6. They receives the RREQ from S and check whether
they are the destination. Since their routing tables are empty at the beginning, they
add a record for S into the tables. Then they append their IDs to the RREQ and
propagate it by transmitting it as a local broadcast packet. In the six copies of the
Route Request, the route information is [s, v1], [s, v2, ], [s, v3], [s, v4], [s, v5] and [s, v6]
respectively.
Node v7, v8 and d are out of the transmission range of S so that they cannot
receive the RREQ directly from S. During the second round broadcast, the RREQ
reaches these three nodes. Node v7 and v8 repeats the same procedures as v1 . . . v6.
Node D checks the request message and finds it is the intended destination. D
generates a Route Reply (RREP) and copy the list of intermediate nodes, without
loss of generality, {v6}. The RREP is returned to S by traversing the reverse path,
{d, v6, s}. During the meantime, v7 and v8 broadcast separately their copies of the
Route Request, including two different routes [s, v6, v7] and [s, v6, v8].
Fig. 14 illustrates the route discover using DSR-TRUECON. DSR-TRUECON
has the same routing procedures as DSR. However the transmission range of each
node is dramatically reduced as a result of TRUECON. It is observed that the route
in Fig. 14.d has more hops than that in Fig. 13, {s, v4, v6, v8, d} versus {s, v6, d}.
This is desirable for saving energy because the transmission power decreases to the
αth power of the distance between a transmitter and a receiver, α ∈ [2, 6].
Comparing Fig. 13.b with Fig. 14.b, DSR-TRUECON constrains the interfer-
ence area within a much smaller region than the standard DSR. Alleviation on radio
interference can improve the network throughput and shorten the packet delay.
If a node receives two RREQs respectively, it can determine whether they are the
same request by checking their identifiers. The request identifier is set by the source
node and not changed by intermediate nodes. A Route Request received before may
57
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
d
s [s]
(a)
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
d
s
[s,v3][s,v2]
[s,v1]
[s,v4]
[s,v5]
[s,v6]
(b)
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v8
d
s [s,v6 ,v7]
[s,v6 ,v8]
(c)
Fig. 13. Routing using DSR for the MANET in Fig. 12.
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Fig. 14. Routing using DSR-TRUECON for the MANET in Fig. 12.
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be sent out again in DSR-TRUECON if it has a lower cost than others.
c. Overpayment of DSR-TRUECON
DSR-TRUECON guarantees to discover a minimum transmission power (MTP) path.
The source node needs to pay whatever price the path turns out in order to assure
the Individual Rationality (IR). Obviously, the price of a MTP path is higher than
the total cost and not necessary to be the cheapest among all the paths connecting
the same source and destination.
Definition C.1 Overpayment (OP ) is the ratio of the total payment against the total
cost along a path.
Then
OPS,D =
∑l−1
i=1wvi∑l−1
i=0 Pvi
(4.11)
In 4.11, wvi is the payment to node vi and Pvi is the transmission power of node
vi, (v0 = S). On a l-hop path, there are l − 1 nodes transmitting data packets,
including the source S and there are l − 2 nodes earning payment.
The overpayment of DSR-TRUECON could be very high when a forwarding node
is paid at the maximum rate and very close to its successor. Fig. 15 shows such a
case. Node b, d, e are the forwarding neighbors for a. On the path {c, b, a}, b is close
to its successor a. Though c is near b, it does not satisfy the direction constraint
when it takes over b. Therefore, the payment to b is equal to the power to reach a
farther replacement node b′. As a result, the overpayment of this path is high.
Network nodes may not be happy if they pay too much for a MTP path and
become financially broke fast. In order to bound the overpayment, we revise the
TRUECON algorithm to pay a forwarding neighbor by whatever is smaller between
the pre-decided payment and the cost to reach its predecessor from its successor along
60
b
a
c
b’
de
Fig. 15. {c, b, a} is of a minimum transmission power path from node c to node a. b′,
b and a on the same straight line. The angles formed by b, a, d and b, a, e are
the same as 5pi
6
. The distance from b to a is ². In TRUECON, the payment
to b is equal to the power on (a, b′).
a path. We call the revised algorithm TRUECON-ECO, since it assures the economy
of an outcome. Then we prove that the overpayment can be bounded for the source
node.
Lemma C.4 TRUECON-ECO is strategy-proof.
Proof As TRUECON, a node u periodically sends Hello messages into its neighbor-
hood and collects Acks. A neighbor vi announces the transmission power Pˆvi,u in the
Ack. The selection function, k : Pˆv1 × Pˆv2 . . . Pˆvn → K, chooses the smallest set of
forwarding neighbors, which make the direction constraint satisfied. Let k∗ be the
outcome of TRUECON-ECO mechanism, and
k∗ = argmin
k∈K
∑
i
Pˆvi(k, Pˆvi,u), vi ∈ Neiu, with d. c. (4.12)
The payment function tvi of TRUECON has two choices. It can assigns the
payment to the forwarding neighbor vi as the announced power value of the first
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node vj, which can replace vi without violation of the direction constraint. Then
decided price of vi is wvi(k
∗, Pvi,u) = Pˆvj ,u. Or tvi waits until a path going through
vi and u, where the tvi is running. The payment will not be delivered until a node is
selected on a path and starts forwarding data packets.
Suppose vi is on a path, the predecessor of vi is vh, vh 6= vj, and the successor of
vi is u. Node u can communicate to vh using its maximum power. So u has received
vj’s announce power Pˆvj ,u in the past. Since u is the node behind vi on the path and
needs to endorse vi’s payment, it compares Pˆvj with Pˆvh and decides on the smaller
value between them.
The utility of a node i equals the sum of its payment and its cost. Then
uvi(k
∗, Pvi) = Pvi,u + ti(k
∗, Pˆvi,u)
Apparently, TRUECON-ECO is a direct-revelation mechanism, in which every
node has a quasi-linear utility function. The outcome function of TRUECON-ECO
is in the same form as TRUECON. The payment function assigns the payment to a
selected node based on the other nodes’ declared values.
The only difference between TRUECON and TRUECON-ECO is the payment
function tvi . By 4.3, a payment function of a VCG mechanism consists of two parts.
One is an arbitrary function on all the reported values, except Pˆvi . The revision of
TRUECON-ECO comparing with TRUECON is right on the h(.) function. Conse-
quently, it offsets the difference and keeps TRUECON-ECO as a VCG mechanism.
TRUECON-ECO belongs to the VCG mechanism family, which is strategy-proof
for direct-revelation mechanisms with quasi-linear utility functions. So TRUECON-
ECO is strategy-proof.
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Fig. 16. {c, b, a} is of a part of a minimum transmission power path from node S to
node D.
We denote the DSR routing protocol with TRUECON-ECO integration as DSR-
TRUECON-ECO.
Theorem C.5 In DSR-TRUECON-ECO, the upper bound of the overpayment along
a MTP path is 2α.
We prove that the overpayment for DSR-TRUECON-ECO has an upper bound,
which varies on different radio propagation models.
For the scenario in Fig. 16, we let b¯ be the projection of b on segment (a, b).
The source node a is two-hop away from the destination node c. The payment to the
forwarding node b is the same as the transmission power on edge (a, c). The cost of
this route equals to the sum of the transmission power on (a, b) and (b, c). By (2.11),
we have
OPa,c <
dαa,c
dα
a,b¯
+ dα
b¯,c
(4.13)
≤ d
α
a,c
(1
2
da,c)α + (
1
2
da,c)α
(4.14)
= 2α−1 (4.15)
Since α ∈ [2, 6], OPa,c varies between 2 and 32.
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Fig. 17. Case study of the overpayment during routing. The lines connecting (a, b),
(b, c), (c, d), and (d, e) represent the minimum energy path from node a to
the last node while the lines connecting (a, c), (b, d) and (c, e) represent the
Euclidean distance on which the payment value is based.
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Fig. 17 shows more scenarios in MANETs. In Fig. 17.a, the overpayment OP
for route {a, b, c} is
OPa,c =
(da,c)
α
(da,b)α + (db,c)α
(4.16)
As a, b, c form a triangle, we have
da,c < da,b + db,c (4.17)
In Fig. 17.b the route between the source node a and the destination d has three
hops. We have
OPa,d =
(da,c)
α + (db,d)
α
(da,b)α + (db,c)α + (dc,d)α
(4.18)
Similarly, in In Fig. 17.c,
OPa,e =
(da,c)
α + (db,d)
α + (dc,e)
α
(da,b)α + (db,c)α + (dc,d)α + (dd,e)α
(4.19)
While we use the free-space radio propagation model, in formulas α is equal to
2. By 4.17, for the scenario in Fig. 17.a, we have
d2a,c < (da,b + db,c)
2 (4.20)
Thus,
d2a,c
d2a,b + d
2
b,c
< 1 +
2da,bdb,c
d2a,b + d
2
b,c
(4.21)
As d2a,b + d
2
b,c ≥ 2da,bdb,c, then
OPa,c ≤ 2 (4.22)
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This result conforms to (4.15). If the source node a is connected to c when they
transmit using the maximum power and there is only one forwarding node between
them after TRUECON terminates, the overpayment on such a route cannot be greater
than two times of the cost of a minimum power path.
By substitution, we have
OPa,d <
2d2a,b + 2d
2
b,c + 2d
2
b,c + 2d
2
c,d
d2a,b + d
2
b,c + d
2
c,d
(4.23)
= 2 +
2d2b,c
d2a,b + d
2
b,c + d
2
c,d
(4.24)
< 4 (4.25)
Similarly, we have
OPa,e < 2 +
2d2b,c + 2d
2
c,d
d2a,b + d
2
b,c + d
2
c,d + d
2
d,e
(4.26)
< 4 (4.27)
We apply the result to the general graph. The path length is denoted as L.
OP ≤
 2 L = 24 L > 2 (4.28)
When the radio propagation model is a two-way reflection model, due to the
radio attenuation, transmission power varies as the fourth power of the distance.
By 4.17, for the scenario in Fig. 17.a we have
d4a,c < (da,b + db,c)
4 (4.29)
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= d4a,b + d
4
b,c + 4d
3
a,bdb,c + 6d
2
a,bd
2
b,c + 4da,bd
3
b,c (4.30)
Then,
OPa,c =
d4a,c
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.31)
<
d4a,b + d
4
b,c + 4d
3
a,bdb,c + 6d
2
a,bd
2
b,c + 4da,bd
3
b,c
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.32)
= 1 +
2da,bdb,c(2d
2
a,b + 2d
2
b,c + 3da,bdb,c)
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.33)
≤ 1 + 2da,bdb,c(2d
2
a,b + 2d
2
b,c +
3
2
d2a,b +
3
2
d2b,c)
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.34)
= 1 +
7da,bdb,c(d
2
a,b + d
2
b,c)
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.35)
≤ 1 +
7
2
(d2a,b + d
2
b,c)(d
2
a,b + d
2
b,c)
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.36)
= 1 +
7
2
+
2d2a,bd
2
b,c
d4a,b + d
4
b,c
(4.37)
≤ 11
2
(4.38)
By substitution, for the scenarios in Fig. 17.b and Fig. 17.c, we have
OPa,d <
11
2
d4a,b +
11
2
d4b,c +
11
2
d4b,c +
11
2
d4c,d
d4a,b + d
4
b,c + d
4
c,d
(4.39)
=
11
2
+
11
2
d4b,c
d4a,b + d
4
b,c + d
4
c,d
(4.40)
< 11 (4.41)
And,
OPa,e <
11
2
+
11
2
d4b,c +
11
2
d4c,d
d4a,b + d
4
b,c + d
4
c,d + d
4
d,e
(4.42)
< 11 (4.43)
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By 4.31 - 4.43, the total payment of a MTP path cannot exceed 11 times of
the total cost along the path, while the two-ray reflection radio propagation model
applies. As a result, we have
OP ≤

11
2
L = 2
11 L > 2
(4.44)
The overpayment has a significant impact on the usability of a mechanism. If
a mechanism cannot restrain its overpayment, a node may run of money quickly
and cannot afford any form of communication. Then the performance of the whole
network degrades. In TRUECON-ECO, even though a source node does not know
how much the total cost of a path is, it knows it cannot pay more than 2α times of
the total cost. An bound of the overpayment is also important for deciding how much
start funding needs to be deposited for every node in a network.
D. Simulation of TRUECON
We simulate DSR-TRUECON-ECO in MANETs to evaluate the system performance
from the perspectives of topology control and routing. As a reference, we also simulate
MANETs, in which every node transmits using the maximum power.
In our experiments, network nodes are distributed uniformly, except a source
node and a destination node, into a 600m × 600m area. Each node has an identi-
cal radio component, which has a transmission range of 150m. All the nodes are
stationary and do not move throughout the experiments.
A node can adjust its transmission power continuously. Though in real world a
wireless device may not be able to alter its emission power gradually, changing the
sending power at different levels is feasible. To simplify the analysis, we grant every
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node a total control over their power.
A node can measure the received signal strength and the direction, from which
a packet comes. It reduces the communication power based on locally information.
After every node has decided its power level, we measure the induced network graph
and compare it with the original graph.
After TRUECON terminates at each node, a source node starts a route discovery
to find a path to a destination node. This pair of nodes is intentionally placed on
different sides of a network such that a path between them always has multiple hops.
By the design of DSR-TRUECON-ECO, the path is a MTP path. The total cost, sum
of transmission power, along the path is compared with that in the original graph, in
which each node communicates using the maximum power.
We investigate the result data several metrics, which are average communication
range, average node degree, overpayment on a path from S to D, hop ratio and cost
ratio. The total number of network nodes varies from 50 to 300. The figures on pages
69-75 present the simulation results. Each point on the graphs represents an average
value of 100 runs.
Fig. 18 shows the average communication range of each node at different node
densities. As the node density rises, the communication range decreases. In the sparse
network graphs, the average Euclidean distance between different nodes is farther
than that in the dense graph. So in sparse network, a node is expected to have a
smaller neighbor set at the maximum transmission power and need to keep a longer
communication range in order to maintain the connectivity. While there are many
nodes in network, each node holds a larger neighbor set at the maximum transmission
power. It can drop off many nodes without degrading the network connectivity.
Fig. 19 shows the normalized transmission power with different radio propagation
models. In the free space model, the path loss exponent α equals 2. In the simulation,
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the shortest average communication range is about 41 meters when the number of
network nodes is 300. It is below one third of the maximum range. It allows a
node to save about 90 percent of its transmission power without the concern of being
separated from the rest part of a network. When come to the two-ray ground reflection
model the difference is even more significant because α is equal to 4. Though in a
real world scenario, the minimum transmission power may not be achieved due to
the irregularity of radio propagation, a shorter range does means much less power.
Therefore shortening the communication range is still an attractive means to save
energy.
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Fig. 18. Average communication range.
Fig. 20 plots the average degree at different node density. Without the topology
control mechanism, the node degree increases linearly as the node density increases.
The higher connection degree the higher probability of packet collisions and the longer
packet delay. The network throughput deteriorates dramatically at a high degree.
70
50 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of network nodes
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 tr
an
sm
iss
io
n 
po
we
r r
at
io
W/o topology control
W/ topology control(Free space)
W/ topology control(Two−ray reflection)
Fig. 19. Average power ratio.
Using TRUECON topology control mechanism, the node degree almost stays as a
constant value.
Figs. 21 - 23 show the simulation results in term of the overpayment. The bars
with two different colors in Fig. 21 show the average values of the overpayment along a
path using the free space model and the two-ray ground reflection model respectively.
Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 display the average values along with standard deviations. As we
have proved, with the free space model, the overpayment cannot be greater than 4.
For the two-ray ground reflection model the upper bound is 11. Experiment results
conform to those bounds.
Fig. 24 demonstrates the normalized hops of a TRUECON MTP path against
the MTP path before using TRUECON. They are for the same pair of source and
destination in the same network. Fig. 25 shows the cost (total transmission power)
ratio between the two MTP paths.
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Fig. 20. Average node degree.
While TRUECON preserves the network connectivity, it does not maintain every
power efficient path between arbitrary node pairs. Our simulation indicates that the
Minimum Transmission Power paths in TRUECON-induced graphs are very close to
their counterparts in the original graphs in terms of path length and total cost.
Figs. 26 and 27 depict two networks with 100 and 200 nodes respectively. They
show how much TRUECON can reduce the node degree while keeping the network
connectivity untouched.
E. Summary
We study the topology control problem of MANETs in a non-cooperative environ-
ment. Due to the limited energy reserve of a network node, saving energy is critical
to maintain the usability of a MANET. Topology control algorithms allow network
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Fig. 21. Overpayment for two different propagation models.
nodes to reduce their transmission power while keeping the same network connectivity
as they use the maximum power. However, there is no guarantee on the collaboration
among network nodes in MANETs. Forwarding packets for others only incurs energy
consumption on intermediate nodes without any obvious benefit. Limited critical
resource possession gives an intention to every node to act selfishly.
We propose a truthful topology control mechanism (TRUECON) to attack the
selfish intention. TRUECON is a direct-revelation mechanism, in which every node
has a quasi-linear utility function. TRUECON belongs to the VCG mechanism family.
The truthfulness is proved in this research.
TRUECON can be integrated with ad hoc routing protocols. We revise DSR
routing protocol to find a minimum transmission path over the induced network
graph. Though the payment along a path must be higher than the actual cost in
order to give an incentive to the forwarding nodes, the overpayment has a bound.
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Fig. 22. Overpayment for the free space propagation model.
We prove the bound is only related to the radio path loss exponent. We simulate
TRUECON mechanism in different scenarios. The experimental data conforms to
our analysis.
TRUECON has its limit in sparse networks. If it is hardly to find replacements
for some forwarding nodes, the payment, which is satisfied by both payer and payee,
cannot be decided easily. This is also a limit of VCG mechanisms. The impact of
node mobility is also worth some future work.
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Fig. 23. Overpayment for the two-ray ground reflection propagation model.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 26. Topology control for a network with 100 nodes.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 27. Topology control for a network with 200 nodes.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Wireless mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a promising communication technol-
ogy. It can be deployed anywhere and anytime without the dependence on any in-
frastructures. However the small form factor and limited energy reserve of network
nodes pose computation-constraint and resource-constraint to researchers. Energy is
the most critical resource in a MANET. In order to prolong the network lifetime, a
wealth of research effort has been paid to minimize the energy consumption.
In this dissertation we investigate the resource management problem in MANETs
from a game-theoretic approach. A node can be selfish, but it is also rational. Its
preference is described as a utility function. The only goal of a rational node is to
maximize the outcome of its utility function. We design two truthful mechanisms for
network routing and topology control in MANETs.
Anonymity has been studied widely in wired networks. Only little research has
been conducted in wireless networks. We extend the definition of being truthful to
another level. We consider in some circumstance, a network user tells the truth only
when she knows her privacy is protected.
A. Summary of Contributions
We make the following contributions via this research.
1. We propose a truthful routing protocol - Transmission power rEcursive Auction
Mechanism routing protocol (TEAM) to deal with selfish nodes. TEAM is a
truthful protocol, in which each node has to tell its true value in order to maxi-
mize its expected benefit. When come to power efficiency, TEAM approximates
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the optimal solution within a bound. Comparing to another truthful routing
protocol – Ad-hoc VCG, which needs n3 messages, TEAM has a much better
message complexity – n2.
2. Truthful topology control is another contribution to non-cooperative MANETs.
Based on CBTC algorithm, we design a truthful mechanism – TRUECON to
implement the well-known VCG mechanisms from a novel approach. We prove
that TRUECON is strategy-proof and preserves the network connectivity. In
TRUECON, each node declares its cost for forwarding packets to its neighbors.
Its service payment is decided based on its declared value. We show how a
routing protocol can be enhanced with TRUECON to find a Minimum Trans-
mission Power path (MTP). Though the payment needs to be higher than the
actual total cost of all the nodes, we prove that the overpayment has a bound
at 2α, where α is the path loss exponent.
To our best knowledge, TRUECON is a pioneering work for MANETs. We
believe that the non-cooperative character catches the nature of MANETs. As a
result, truthful mechanisms are needed at any time when network nodes interact
with each other.
3. We conduct a study on enhancement of anonymous communication in MANETs
by reducing the transmission power of network nodes. Appendix A presents
our study. We propose a routing protocol - Whisper, which can prevent a
communication initiator from being revealed in some circumstances. Whisper
does not rely on any asymmetric encryption facility, which could be prohibitive
to implement on small mobile devices. We obtain some preliminary results of
Whisper by simulation.
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B. Future Work
In this dissertation, we concentrate on stationary networks, in which network nodes
do not move. Though we are confident on that our research works can be validated
within a mobile environment, the impacts of node mobility on system performance
need future works.
It is observed that though truthful mechanisms can frustrate the selfishness, in
a complex network environment, they may not be enough alone. Integrating with
other network security techniques, such as cryptographic techniques, we can expect
the emergence of more powerful mechanisms to defeat any selfish temptations and
achieve the resource efficiency.
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APPENDIX A
A STUDY OF ANONYMITY IN MANETS
1. Introduction and Motivation
Privacy is a human right protected in both real world and cyberspace. In many
researches, keeping data as anonymous as possible is the prerequisite for conducting
experiments on people. Since the introduction of the British Data Protection Act
(1998) [50], anonymity is not only an ethical issue, but also a legal implication. In
the Internet, anonymous communication is demanded in many applications, such as
E-voting systems and web transactions, etc. Anonymity in mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs) has not draw much attention yet because of the relatively short history of
this research area. However, with more and more emerging applications of MANETs,
anonymity poses a concern to network design and configuration.
A wealth of anonymous systems has been proposed for wired networks. They
address the different network environments, making them difficult to migrate to the
highly dynamic ad-hoc context. For example, Onion [51, 52, 53] is a successful anony-
mous system in wired networks. It is not only able to conceal the sender from the
recipient but also to hide correlation between a sender and its recipient. However
it needs a centralized server and uses asymmetric encryption mechanisms, which are
either impractical or too costly to be implemented in MANETs.
A sound solution of anonymity in MANETs can be found in ANODR [54], in
which data packets are encrypted hop by hop like an onion structure. However, it
bans the IDs in any data transmission, which results in lack of compatibility with
most of the existing routing and MAC protocols.
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Due to the limited energy and computational ability, the widely used public key
mechanism is extremely expensive to be applied in MANETs. With consideration
of the characteristics of MANETs, we propose Whisper routing protocol to enhance
anonymity protection of the initiator or source node. The initiator anonymity is con-
sidered most critical in many applications, comparing to the destination anonymity
and initiator/destination linkability. Whisper is compatible to the current fully-
fledged MAC layer protocols.
In whisper, a topology control algorithm, such as CBTC [48], is run by each
node before the routing takes place. A node sends a Route Request packet to its
nearest neighbor with a probability pf or starts a route discovery with a probability
1 − pf . A forwarding node replaces the source ID in the packet with its own ID.
Therefore the intermediate nodes act as proxies for finding a path from the source to
the destination.
In MANETs, eavesdroppers can be more effective than in wired networks. They
do not have to be chosen as a router on the transmission path while overhearing all
the data packets of its neighbors. Whisper lets nodes use the minimum transmission
power to talk to their nearest neighbors. Consequently, the number of nodes ex-
posed to the passive attackers is reduced dramatically, especially in a dense network.
Reducing transmission power can also save energy and decrease the radio interference.
The remainder of Appendix A is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief
review on related work. The threat model is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the design of Whisper. Section 5 discusses attacking and counterattack strategies.
Simulation results and analysis can be found in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
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2. Related Work
Anonymous communication has been studied extensively in the environment of wired
networks. Anonymizer [55] is a web proxy providing anonymous communication ser-
vices for web clients in a network. It filters out the service requester’s identity infor-
mation contained in the header and replaces it with the identity of the Anonymizer-
server. All messages can only be traced back to the server after they go through it.
Therefore the real web clients are protected. This scheme is simple and easy to be
applied. However, as the only intermediate node, the Anonymizer-server is apt to be
the target and becomes the single failure point. Moreover, the scheme is not scalable
to network growth since the payload of the Anonymizer-server increases linearly with
the network size.
A mix [56] is an enhancement of the proxy-based scheme. It collects messages
with fixed length from different sources, cryptographically transforms these messages,
and sends them to their recipients in a different order. It is further developed as
Onion-routing schemes in [51, 52, 53]. In Onion-routing schemes, there is an onion-
router network, in which each onion-router works like a mix. A sender chooses a
sequence of onion-routers as the rerouting path. The path can be reused for a period.
Each message passes through the sequence of onion-routers before it reaches the
recipient. Onion not only hides a sender from its recipient, but also prevents global
eavesdroppers from linking the sender with the recipient. However, the schemes are
not scalable using a fixed number of onion-routers. Since there are no centralized
servers in ad-hoc networks working as onion-routers, the schemes cannot be applied
in ad-hoc networks directly.
Crowds [57] is a well known anonymous communication protocol to protect In-
ternet transactions. The intuition of Crowds is to hide the communication in crowds.
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A member of the Crowds forwards service requests and data for others. Eavesdrop-
ping cannot help to identify the initiator of a data request if it intercepts a packet in
the middle. Different anonymous degrees are defined as from “absolute anonymous”
to “provable exposed”. Crowds can achieve possible innocence in the presence of c
collaborators, which are snooping the network traffic and try to locate the initiator,
if the Crowds has n members and n satisfies
n ≥ pf
pf − 12
(c+ 1)
Sui et al. [58] prove the participant payload in Crowds does not depend on the size
of the crowd and its expected value is 1
1−pf + 1.
ANODR [54] is a complete solution for anonymity in ad-hoc networks using
encryption facilities. The identities of network nodes are banned in each network
protocol layer. A sender in ANODR chooses the routing path like regular AODV
routing protocol, but messages are encrypted by every intermediate node like an
onion. Only the recipient can open the ”trap-door” in the message and know it
is the destination of the message. This scheme gains full anonymity even under
global eavesdropping. However, the absence of IDs poses challenges for the protocol
implementation and limits its applications.
[59] proposes the concept of k-anonymous and its applications. They also present
a simple and efficient communication protocol, in which an adversary is only able to
narrow down the suspicious sender or receiver to a set of k nodes.
3. Threat Model
A source node (or an initiator) is the start of a path. A destination node is the end
of a path. There are three types of anonymity to achieve:
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• Initiator anonymity. The identity of the initiator needs to be prevented from
being revealed.
• Destination anonymity. The ID of the intended destination should be prevented
from being revealed.
• Initiator-destination linkability. If an attacker observes a series of initiators and
destinations but cannot figure out whether they are related by all means, we
say the anonymity of initiator-destination linkability is achieved.
From the research results in the past, we know that the initiator anonymity is
the most important in many cases. Enhancing the initiator anonymity protection in
MANETs is the motivation of this study.
In a wireless network, network traffic is transferred in the open medium - air. If a
node vi is within the communication range of another node vj, then i can overhear all
the packets vj sends out even though they are not addressed to vi. Due to the design
of routing protocols, a packet usually contains the identities of the source node, the
destination node, and the forwarding node of each hop. Therefore even if we encrypt
the content of a packet, the routing information stored in the packet header is still
vulnerable to passive anonymity attackers who want to identify the initiator.
We define three different attack scenarios:
• A local attacker is always able to overhear all the traffic of its neighbors. It
tries to figure out which node is the initiator based on the intercepted packets.
A compromised initiator is also in this category.
• Attackers may collaborate with each other and exchange information in order to
solve the puzzle by correlating all the clues caught locally. Each collaborating
attacker is a collaborator. Please note that if there are multiple attackers in a
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Fig. 28. The stars are the collaborators who are monitoring the dark area to locate an
initiator.
MANET but they never talk to each other, we regard them as a set of local
attackers.
• An end server attacker is the destination node, which could be a server receiving
service requests.
In a MANET, each passive attacker can monitor its vicinity, collaborate and
exchange information with other attackers. Fig 28 shows the scenario, in which a
group of such attackers collaborate to eavesdrop the network and try to pinpoint the
initiator.
4. Design of Whisper
In a MANET, each node may act as a router to serve others in order to fulfill the
network function. Then the network nodes form a pool of forwarding routers like
Crowds [57]. In contrast to ANODR [54], we preserve the node IDs in a packet
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(a) (b)
Fig. 29. The stars are nodes eavesdropping on network traffic. The center node of
the shadow area is a source node, which initiates a communication session.
(a)When the sending node communicates at high power level, it is likely to be
overheard by at least one of the eavesdroppers. (b)The sending node reduces
its transmission power to avoid the eavesdroppers.
though the value of the source ID in a packet is changed hop by hop along the
Whisper path. The definition of a Whisper path is given later in this section. We
assume that every node knows its location and broadcasts the information with Hello
messages periodically. Hence, each node knows its neighbors’ IDs and locations.
In Whisper, a source node S transfers (whispers) a Route Request (RREQ)
packet to its nearest neighbor v1 with a probability pf using the minimum transmission
power. Or it starts a Route Discovery with a probability 1 − pf . Upon receiving a
RREQ, v1 make its choice between forwarding the packet to the nearest neighbor and
initiating a route discovery with the same probability as S. This process repeats at
each forwarding node as long as every node chooses sending to its nearest neighbor.
If a node decides to relay the packet to its nearest neighbor, it always excludes
the node, from which the packet comes. After locating the nearest neighbor, the
forwarding node replaces the source ID in the packet with its own ID. When a node
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vi finally decides to start a route discovery process, it uses an AODV-like routing
protocols to find a path. From then on, the ID of the source node in the packet
remains unchanged as vi.
On a path from S to D, the part between S and vi is called Whisper path and
the part after vi until D is called normal path. A path is expressed as a series of node
IDs. Then the Whisper path is σWhisper{S, n1, n2, . . . , ni}. Node ni is the last node
on Whisper path and the first one on normal path. The normal path is described as
σnormal{ni, . . . , nl = D}, where l > i.
Due to the characteristic of radio propagation, the received signal strength Pr
can be expressed as
Pr =
K × Pt
dα
where K is a constant and α is a number between 2 and 6 [35]. If Pr is greater than
a threshold Pthd, the data can be received successfully by the receiver, otherwise the
data is lost. Since a node can adjust the transmission power of its radio component,
the communication area can be refined within a certain range. Whisper lets nodes use
the minimum power to forward packets to its nearest neighbor, therefore the number
of overhearing nodes along the Whisper path is reduced to minimum. Fig 29 shows
the effect of various transmission power used by a sending node.
If an attacker is in the communication range of an initiator, it can always locate
it by analyzing the observed traffic pattern. An intermediate node may receive a
packet first, then sends out a packet later on. The initiator usually has no incoming
traffic before it sends the first packet. To deal with this special case, we let the MAC
layer be involved. For example, in 802.11 protocol, a pair of RTS (Request-To-Send)
and CTS (Clear-To-Send) are exchanged between sending and receiving nodes. To
imitate this process, we let the initiator send a CTS, followed by an Ack (Packet
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Acknowledgment) after a short time period. From the neighbor’s point of view, this
is a typical packet receiving procedure. Then a neighbor believes the real initiator
has received a packet from another node, even when the RTS is not heard. Due to
the hidden terminal problem, not hearing incoming packets happens frequently while
the overhearing node and the sending node reside on different side of the receiving
node.
An attacker can figure out this trick only in following cases.
• The node with the inserted ID in the CTS does not exist in the network. This
requires the full knowledge of a network. In a MANET, a node can join and
leave the network at any time thus it is non-trivial to get this knowledge.
• The inserted ID belongs to a collaborator or a node from which the attacker
can get a proof on whether it does the communication.
Based on the observation, we can let an initiator only insert the ID of a trustable node
in the network. And that node never answers any inquiry about its communication
sessions.
5. Analysis of Whisper
In this section, we analyze the strategies of passive attackers and show how the
anonymity is enforced in MANETs with Whisper.
a. Strategies of Passive Attackers
We adopt the method in [60] to analyze the strategies used by passive attackers
which are collaborating with each other. Suppose that there are M attackers in
a MANET, and the attackers know the forwarding path selection algorithm and
related parameters (e.g. pf ). We denote the attackers (or collaborators) as a set
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of compromised nodes, {C1, C2, . . . , Ci, . . . , CM}. When an attacker Ci overhears a
message, it records the event in the format of < tCi , PCi , Ci, SCi , QCi >, where tCi
is the time when the message is heard; PCi is the sender in this hop; SCi is the
receiver in this hop, and QCi is the set of nodes that can be excluded from the set of
possible initiators by Ci. If Ci does not hear anything, it just generates a report as
< tCi , Ci, QCi > to indicate nothing happens around it. The collaborators exchange
their reports and sort them by the order of tCi . They try to find out the initiator
based on the partially identified path. To determine a set of possible initiators, the
collaborators construct a node set NS including all of the nodes, which are impossible
to be the initiator, according to the reports. The rules of NS construction are listed
in Table V.
If L′ is the maximum path length of any route from the source S to the destination
D, the attackers can always confidently remove those nodes that are farther than
L′ hops away from the spot of the overheard communication. It is because that
the communication range of a network node is limited. However this requires the
collaborators to have the full knowledge of the network topology, which is dynamically
changing.
After information collection, the collaborators attempt to find out which node is
more likely to be the real initiator among the set of possible nodes. The probability
of PC1 being the initiator is denoted as
Pr{S = PC1|F = w} =
Pr{S = PC1 , F = w}
P (F = w)
(A.1)
=
∑∞
k=|Ni| p
k
f (1− pf ) 1k−|Ni|+1
P (F = w)
(A.2)
S is the identified initiator; F denotes the facts that the collaborators collected;
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Table V. NS CONSTRUCTION RULES
Rule Pre-condition Action
R1 (PC1= NULL) and (SC1 6= NULL) NS:=NS ∪ (V \{C1})
R2 (PC1 6= NULL) and the partial path from NS:=NS ∪ (V \{PC1})
C1 to R is completely identified and
the path length is L′
R3 ∀Ci ∈ CNH NS:=NS ∪{Ci} ∪ {QCi}
R4 ∀k > 1, Ck ∈ CH NS:=NS ∪{Ck, PCk , SCk} ∪ {QCk}
R5 PC1 6= NULL NS:=NS ∪{C1, SC1} ∪ {QC1}
R6 (PC1 6= NULL) and the partial path from NS:=NS ∪{PC1}
C1 to R is completely identified and
the path length is less than L′
R7 L > 0 NS:=NS ∪ {D.P}
Notations:
CNH a set of attackers which overhear nothing
CH a set of attackers which overhear messages
V a set of all nodes in the network
L path length
L′ guessed path length by the adversary
D.P immediate predecessor of the message receiver
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w is the reports generated by the attackers; n is the number of network nodes; k is the
path length and |Ni| represents the number of nodes, which cannot be the initiator.
(A.2) is the sum of the probabilities of that PCi is the initiator, given the path length
as k. The product of the first two terms is the probability of a k-hop path. The third
term is the probability of PC1 being the initiator, given the path length.
If PC1 is not an initiator, all other nodes, which cannot be eliminated, have the
same probability to be the initiator. We have
Pr{S = s|F = w} = 1− Pr{S = PC1|F = w}
n− |NS| − 1 (A.3)
s denotes the true sender.
b. Strategies of Protecting Anonymity with Whisper
We let the coverage area of a MANET be σ and a node’s transmission range be R.
We model the communication region as a Unit Disk Graph (UDG). Thus σ = piR2.
The node density in an area Sa is
n
Sa
. Then the expected neighbor number of a
sender is piR2 n
S
. If there are c collaborators in the whole area, then the number of
collaborators in the transmission area of sending node is piR2 c
Sa
. If c and Sa are fixed,
the smaller the transmission range, the less the probability of the sending node being
captured by any attacker. If this value is less than 1, we would say a transmission is
not likely to be overheard by even one attacker.
Obviously, if the collaborators can eliminate more nodes from the set of possible
initiators, they have higher probability to identify the true initiator. From NS con-
struction rules in Table V, we can find that how to get QCi becomes the key issue
for the collaborators to make a good guess. An adversary derives QCi = NCi − PCi ,
where NCi is the set of nodes that Ci can overhear from. If every node is required to
send messages with high transmission power in a MANET where the nodes are evenly
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distributed, it can be approximated that |NCi| = npiR
2
S
. If a node only send messages
to its nearest neighbor with minimum power, an adversary can only approximate NCi
as the set of nodes within the transmission range r, where r is the average distance
between two adjacent nodes in the network. In this case, |NCi| can be approximated
as npir
2
S
. Clearly, in a non-sparse MANET, after every node reducing its transmission
power, an attacker can eliminate much less nodes from possible initiators. It results
in a much worse guess of the collaborators.
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Fig. 30. A MANET with 15 nodes including attacking node C1.
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For example, we have a MANET as Fig.30 shows. We assume the messages are
transmitted with the maximum power level. C1 generates< t
1
C1
, v4, C1, v7, {v2, v3, v5} >
and < t2C1 , v7, C1, v11, {v2, v3, v5} > since it overhears messages sent from both v4 and
v7. Then NS={v2, v3, v5, v7, C1} and
Pr{S = v4|F = w} =
0.75× 0.25 + 0.752 × 0.25× 1
2
+ . . .
1− 0.25− 0.75× 0.25
= 0.6161
If v4 is not the initiator, the probability that the collaborators can identify the
true initiator is
Pr{S = s|F = w} = (1− Pr{S = v4|F = w})
15− 5− 1
= 0.0427
If the packet is transmitted using reduced power, C1 reports its overhearing
result as < tC1 , v4, C1, v7, {NULL} >. C1 cannot eliminate any node except itself,
then NS={C1}. Then,
Pr{S = v4|F = w} =
0.75× 0.25 + 0.752 × 0.25× 1
2
+ . . .
1− 0.25
= 0.4592
If v4 is not the initiator,
Pr{S = s|F = w} = (1− Pr{S = v4|F = w})
15− 1− 1
= 0.0416
It shows that when messages are transmitted with the reduced power, the collab-
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Fig. 31. Path length versus forwarding probability.
orators have lower probability to identify the real initiator. This justifies the scheme
of reducing transmission power in Whisper.
Since in a MANET a node can move while overhearing the neighborhood, the
communication session should not last long enough for an attacker tracking back from
the destination to the source node.
6. Simulation
We simulate Whisper using ns-2 network simulator [44]. Every node has a radio with
2Mbps bandwidth and 150-meter communication range. We simulate the networks in
a 600m × 600m area, in which we set the node number as 100, 150, 200, 250 and 300.
Nodes are stationary and put into the area uniformly. We assume each node knows its
own location from some positioning services, such as GPS. The location information
is broadcast in Hello messages periodically. The source node and destination node are
put on the different sides of the network area. There is a topology control algorithm
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Fig. 32. Normalized power consumption over a path.
run by every node before the routing takes place.
Whisper runs as a routing protocol over the network layer. The source node
tosses a bias coin, which has a probability Pf in favor of head. If the result is head,
then it sends a Route Request to its nearest neighbor. Otherwise, it starts a Route
Discovery. The receiving neighbor also needs to make a decision on forwarding to
the nearest neighbor, except its predecessor, or initiating a Route Discovery. The
same procedures are taken at the following nodes until a tail comes up. We vary the
forwarding probability as 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. The route length,
the aggregate transmission power and the number of node hearing the communication
are measured.
As references, we simulate the networks, in which every node transmits using
the maximum power, for the same scenarios as Whisper. In these networks, nodes
run AODV to discover a path from the source to the destination and the forwarding
probability is zero. In another word, a source always initiates a route discovery. Thus
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Fig. 33. Number of hearing nodes versus forwarding probability.
the result data of these networks is always displayed as straight lines in the figures.
We plot the simulation results in Fig. 31, 32, 33. Each point in the figures is
the average value of 1000 runs. Fig. 31 shows, in hops, the length of a path between
the source node and the destination node. Fig. 32 presents the ratio of the aggregate
transmission power on a path discovered by Whisper with power control and that
on an AODV path without power control. Fig. 33 displays the number of the node,
which can hear the Route Request packet.
We observe that route length increases as the forwarding probability rises. With
a high forwarding probability, the neighbor is very likely to forward the Route Request
to its nearest neighbor rather than start finding a path to the destination. Therefore,
the total path length is longer at high forwarding probability than at low forwarding
probability.
Because we integrate the topology control technology with Whisper, a node usu-
ally finds a path with more hops than routing without topology control. Fig. 32 shows
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that the short-distance-hop path of Whisper consumes less transmission power than
the AODV path with nodes sending at the maximum power. This result complies
with our discussions in Chapter IV.
Fig. 33 shows the number of nodes, which are able to hear the communication.
These nodes include the intermediate forwarding node and those within the com-
munication range of the sending nodes. If an attacker is among these nodes, it may
collect as much information as possible in order to figure out who is the initiator. The
less these hearing nodes, the smaller the probability they include attackers. While
reducing the transmission power of each node, the communication is confined within
a much smaller set of nodes. This is a desirable property for protecting anonymity in
MANETs. The hearing node number increases with the node density.
7. Summary
Anonymous communication has been studied intensively in the wired network en-
vironment while little work is done for MANETs. Due to the limited computation
capacity of network nodes, anonymous communication protocols designed for wired
networks are not suitable for MANETs. We propose Whisper - a routing protocol to
enhance initiator anonymity in MANETs by reducing transmission power.
In Whisper, a sender transmits messages to its nearest neighbor node with re-
duced power by a certain probability. Whisper does not rely on public key facilities.
Attacking and protecting strategies are analyzed. We show that in certain scenarios,
a passive attacker is more difficult to find the real initiator in a MANET with Whisper
than without.
Simulation results confirm that Whisper incurs less power consumption and
smaller hearing node sets than routing protocols without any intention to control
the transmission power of network nodes.
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APPENDIX B
NETWORK SIMULATION
In this dissertation, we simulate MANETs using ns-2 network simulator [44]
with the wireless extension of Monarch project [45]. The MAC layer protocol is IEEE
802.11, which uses Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance(CSMA/CA).
Every node has an identical radio communication component.
1. Simulation of TEAM
To evaluate system performance of TEAM protocol in terms of power efficiency, we
simulate MANETs in a 300m × 300m area. Every node has a 250-meter maximum
communication range. A pair of nodes are put on different sides of the network area as
the source and the destination. Other nodes are distributed into the area uniformly.
The number of nodes except the source and the destination varies from 2 to 60. We
run an experiment 1000 times for each network scenario. We measure the aggregate
transmission power consumption on TEAM paths and Minimum Transmission Power
(MTP) paths. The ratios of the two values are listed in Table VI.
2. Simulation of TRUECON
We simulate the MANETs, which run TRUECON topology control algorithm, in a
600m × 600m area. Each node has a 150-meter maximum communication range. We
put a pair of node on the different sides of the network area as the source and the
destination. Each node runs TRUECON to adjust its transmission range. Then the
source node starts a route discovery to find a path to the destination node. Two
radio propagation models, free space model and two-ray ground reflection model, are
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Table VI. THE POWER EFFICIENCY RATIO OF TEAM
Node Number Mean Max Standard Deviation
2 1.001481 1.209226 0.000047
4 1.007567 1.449115 0.000239
6 1.018049 1.655392 0.000571
8 1.020374 1.541751 0.000644
10 1.0337 1.766807 0.001066
12 1.03882 1.690144 0.001228
14 1.045251 1.961561 0.009329
16 1.052269 1.932788 0.001653
18 1.058064 1.927126 0.001836
20 1.05592 1.789274 0.011528
22 1.061113 2.045898 0.000745
24 1.070623 1.789599 0.000108
26 1.068386 1.663842 0.001438
28 1.072929 2.081505 0.002306
30 1.074406 1.841529 0.002353
32 1.073218 1.964102 0.005993
34 1.078408 1.802884 0.002292
36 1.080445 1.774716 0.002544
38 1.087305 1.75219 0.002424
40 1.089756 2.1501 0.000766
42 1.083883 1.945597 0.004345
44 1.085873 1.91378 0.002716
46 1.092842 1.912383 0.005316
48 1.087426 1.841414 0.002765
50 1.094422 1.856569 0.000273
52 1.093925 2.200487 0.000841
54 1.098169 2.260616 0.007331
56 1.089928 1.771828 0.002957
58 1.103075 1.979415 0.002889
60 1.098718 2.222226 0.001073
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Table VII. TRUECON SIMULATION RESULTS WITH FREE SPACE RADIO
PROPAGATION MODEL
Nodes Degree Range OP OP Degree H ratio H ratio C ratio C ratio
(TC) (TC) mean std (W/o TC) std mean std
50 4.3012 89.9086 2.5863 0.2986 7.5336 1.0862 0.1356 1.0224 0.0327
60 4.645 85.0844 2.5952 0.2983 9.038 1.0686 0.0943 1.028 0.0449
70 4.9643 81.0842 2.6262 0.2873 10.7114 1.0486 0.1041 1.0209 0.0383
80 5.1273 77.1049 2.6343 0.2781 12.3263 1.0662 0.1042 1.0244 0.0346
90 5.1778 72.6729 2.6479 0.2849 13.8111 1.0758 0.1166 1.0265 0.0327
100 5.3032 70.3489 2.6817 0.2328 15.164 1.0835 0.1353 1.0266 0.0345
110 5.38 66.6618 2.6527 0.2116 16.9816 1.0849 0.1355 1.0263 0.0353
120 5.4468 64.3441 2.6527 0.2341 18.5752 1.0706 0.1250 1.0274 0.0339
130 5.4791 61.3267 2.687 0.2603 19.9782 1.0434 0.1027 1.0224 0.0267
140 5.5294 59.4496 2.7105 0.2341 21.5434 1.0579 0.1004 1.0199 0.0263
150 5.5073 57.1799 2.6435 0.2070 23.1573 1.0556 0.0800 1.0184 0.0221
160 5.5349 55.4419 2.6799 0.2203 24.8226 1.0465 0.0947 1.0216 0.0300
170 5.6201 54.3036 2.6644 0.2333 26.3169 1.0697 0.1124 1.0227 0.0237
180 5.6443 52.7324 2.6802 0.2139 27.7587 1.0639 0.1142 1.0197 0.0248
190 5.6473 51.3226 2.6831 0.2016 29.4097 1.0689 0.0988 1.0209 0.0218
200 5.7057 49.9998 2.726 0.2145 30.9918 1.0617 0.1032 1.019 0.0216
210 5.6567 48.7542 2.6844 0.1832 32.5615 1.0585 0.1026 1.0228 0.0288
220 5.7034 47.7384 2.6927 0.2348 34.2685 1.0666 0.1103 1.0243 0.0298
230 5.6916 46.6236 2.7111 0.2093 35.6128 1.0511 0.1014 1.021 0.0231
240 5.6758 45.5905 2.7262 0.2183 37.1722 1.0578 0.0827 1.0243 0.0277
250 5.7814 44.6707 2.7096 0.2035 38.8658 1.0537 0.0872 1.0246 0.0275
260 5.7685 43.9474 2.7233 0.2227 40.3744 1.0539 0.0861 1.0213 0.0224
270 5.7403 43.0789 2.7167 0.2033 42.0539 1.062 0.0853 1.0215 0.0220
280 5.7726 42.3318 2.7158 0.1963 43.5143 1.0681 0.1029 1.0242 0.0241
290 5.7606 41.5692 2.7183 0.1783 45.229 1.054 0.1010 1.0189 0.0206
300 5.8141 41.0218 2.693 0.1769 46.7325 1.0601 0.0942 1.0233 0.0283
used in the simulation respectively. We run an experiment 100 times for each network
scenario.
We check the node degree and communication range of each node and calculate
the aggregate transmission power on a path from the source to the destination before
and after running TRUECON. The simulation results are displayed in Table VII, VIII.
In the tables, ’OP’ stands for overpayment; ’TC’ denotes topology control; ’W/o TC’
represents without topology control; ’H ratio’ is the ratio of the hop numbers of the
MTP paths before and after running TRUECON; ’C ratio’ is the ratio of the aggregate
transmission powers along the MTP paths before and after running TRUECON; ’std’
means standard deviation.
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Table VIII. TRUECON SIMULATION RESULTSWITH TWO-RAY RADIO PROP-
AGATION MODEL
Nodes Degree Range OP OP Degree H ratio H ratio C ratio C ratio
(TC) (TC) mean std (W/o TC) std mean std
50 4.3152 90.9437 5.79 1.8195 7.5008 1.0154 0.0606 1.003 0.0102
60 4.7173 86.6233 6.0033 1.5632 9.044 1.0101 0.0385 1.0079 0.0210
70 4.9214 81.0751 6.0643 1.4251 10.6146 1.0181 0.0567 1.0089 0.0288
80 5.0713 76.8649 6.0341 1.3928 12.2135 1.0091 0.0276 1.0046 0.0191
90 5.2516 73.3644 6.2396 1.3712 13.8782 1.0126 0.0427 1.0079 0.0244
100 5.3302 69.5836 6.3108 1.334 15.3358 1.0083 0.0451 1.0059 0.0151
110 5.3444 66.6718 6.2287 1.2669 16.7996 1.011 0.0273 1.005 0.0222
120 5.4662 64.1981 6.2367 1.5037 18.4012 1.0124 0.0409 1.0047 0.0163
130 5.5406 61.6315 6.3103 1.4066 20.0657 1.0052 0.0559 1.0036 0.0110
140 5.564 59.346 6.2935 1.214 21.6231 1.0123 0.0337 1.0063 0.0196
150 5.5807 57.8236 6.1407 1.143 23.0204 1.0108 0.0341 1.0068 0.0202
160 5.5641 55.6437 6.1468 1.0946 24.8904 1.0076 0.0277 1.0061 0.0164
170 5.5596 53.7645 6.3378 1.2404 26.3435 1.0259 0.0833 1.006 0.0127
180 5.6229 52.7089 6.5205 1.2235 27.598 1.0101 0.0368 1.005 0.0150
190 5.6597 51.3836 6.3701 1.0574 29.2351 1.0177 0.0394 1.0098 0.0224
200 5.6736 50.0838 6.1255 1.1652 30.8047 1.0041 0.0272 1.005 0.0181
210 5.7347 48.9786 6.431 1.106 32.7119 1.006 0.0308 1.0049 0.0159
220 5.6814 47.6265 6.545 1.0488 34.0149 1.007 0.0211 1.0046 0.0155
230 5.7254 46.7338 6.1591 1.1963 35.8143 1.0118 0.0369 1.0053 0.0179
240 5.7625 45.6311 6.2814 1.0714 37.164 1.0155 0.0634 1.0083 0.0449
250 5.73 44.8152 6.405 1.0065 38.7478 1.006 0.0231 1.0034 0.0103
260 5.7671 43.937 6.5299 1.0496 40.4423 1.0119 0.0365 1.0044 0.0101
270 5.773 43.0991 6.2772 1.0864 42.0253 1.0038 0.0523 1.0055 0.0141
280 5.8099 42.3433 6.4742 1.0844 43.5104 1.003 0.0552 1.0112 0.0522
290 5.7988 41.7672 6.4018 1.1614 44.8729 1.0024 0.0587 1.0057 0.0151
300 5.8221 40.9626 6.3434 1.0454 46.5068 1.0118 0.0301 1.0052 0.0130
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Table IX. HEARING NODE NUMBER IN MANETS WITHOUT TOPOLOGY
CONTROL
100 150 200 250 300
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
37.63 6.13 53.42 8.78 67.38 9.59 81.43 10.36 95.65 10.61
3. Simulation of Whisper
We simulate MANETs with Whisper routing protocol in a 600m × 600m area. Each
nodes has a 150-meter maximum transmission range. We put a pair of nodes on
the different sides of the network area as the source and the destination. Besides the
source and destination nodes. Other network nodes are distributed uniformly into the
area. We simulate the networks with 100, 150, 200, 250 and 300 nodes respectively.
The forwarding probability of every node is varied from 0.1 to 0.9. As a reference,
we also simulate AODV routing protocol for the same network scenarios as Whisper.
For AODV, the forwarding probability of each node is zero and every node transmits
with its maximum power. We run an experiment for 1000 times for each network
scenario.
We measure the number of the nodes, which are able to hear the Route Request
packet sent by the source initially. The path length of runningWhisper is recorded and
compared with the length of the path discovered by AODV. The total transmission
power of the Whisper paths and the AODV paths are checked and compared. The
simulation results are listed in Table IX, X, XI, XII, XIII. In the tables, ’std’ denotes
standard deviation; ’prob’ represents forwarding probability.
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Table X. HEARING NODE NUMBERS IN MANETS WITH TOPOLOGY CON-
TROL
100 nodes 150 nodes 200 nodes 250 nodes 300 nodes
prob mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
0.1 22.55 5.11 27.92 5.88 31.66 6.15 35.54 6.51 38.57 6.75
0.2 22.67 5.11 27.57 5.71 31.92 6.43 35.71 6.66 38.40 6.77
0.3 22.66 5.0 27.59 5.80 31.92 6.23 35.50 6.74 38.96 6.95
0.4 22.86 5.04 28.14 5.74 32.37 6.41 35.87 6.56 38.81 6.56
0.5 22.85 5.30 28.12 5.75 32.19 6.17 35.99 6.53 38.95 6.69
0.6 23.30 5.12 28.22 5.85 32.80 6.48 36.49 6.72 39.37 6.96
0.7 23.38 5.23 28.49 5.73 32.87 6.35 36.85 6.76 39.69 6.90
0.8 23.84 5.40 29.11 6.23 33.25 6.46 37.02 6.97 39.73 7.00
0.9 23.96 5.08 29.69 6.12 33.54 6.74 37.58 7.04 41.18 7.25
Table XI. ROUTE LENGTH (HOPS) IN MANETS WITHOUT TOPOLOGY CON-
TROL
100 150 200 250 300
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
3.64 0.4906 3.43 0.4953 3.255 0.4361 3.144 0.3513 3.079 0.2699
Table XII. ROUTE LENGTH (HOPS) INMANETSWITH TOPOLOGY CONTROL
100 nodes 150 nodes 200 nodes 250 nodes 300 nodes
prob mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
0.1 7.73 1.3442 9.144 1.3947 10.419 1.4295 11.368 1.5182 12.403 1.5372
0.2 7.843 1.3565 9.267 1.3906 10.493 1.4967 11.6827 1.5682 12.4585 1.5884
0.3 8.021 1.4665 9.451 1.5518 10.729 1.6347 11.7267 1.7188 12.7477 1.6787
0.4 8.2623 1.6784 9.758 1.742 11.009 1.8681 11.993 1.844 13.0862 1.8447
0.5 8.5877 1.9583 10.003 2.0454 11.281 2.0259 12.32 2.1133 13.3347 2.1874
0.6 9.0823 2.316 10.5637 2.387 11.747 2.4643 12.8104 2.4811 13.7874 2.5052
0.7 9.8047 2.9692 11.2525 3.1238 12.5296 3.1087 13.7462 3.3303 14.6767 3.2719
0.8 11.3609 4.5486 12.8166 4.7352 14.0655 4.6275 15.5165 4.8689 16.4293 4.9866
0.9 16.3395 9.983 18.1506 9.6922 19.0244 9.3889 20.1348 9.5918 21.1101 9.3893
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Table XIII. THE RATIO OF THE AGGREGATE POWER ON A ROUTE DISCOV-
ERED BY WHISPER AND ON A ROUTE DISCOVERED BY AODV
ROUTING PROTOCOL
100 nodes 150 nodes 200 nodes 250 nodes 300 nodes
prob mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
0.1 0.6945 0.1454 0.5782 0.1085 0.5061 0.0921 0.4510 0.0753 0.4142 0.0676
0.2 0.7001 0.1387 0.5788 0.1108 0.5101 0.0962 0.4521 0.0769 0.4163 0.0676
0.3 0.6957 0.1444 0.5802 0.1151 0.5052 0.0906 0.4495 0.0737 0.4175 0.0695
0.4 0.7100 0.1535 0.5892 0.1200 0.5104 0.0951 0.4601 0.0788 0.4172 0.0664
0.5 0.72 0.1636 0.5862 0.1127 0.5163 0.0954 0.4638 0.0832 0.4212 0.0709
0.6 0.7283 0.1685 0.5990 0.1285 0.5255 0.0985 0.4678 0.0856 0.4240 0.0718
0.7 0.7393 0.1683 0.6090 0.1253 0.5336 0.1042 0.4759 0.0968 0.4309 0.0725
0.8 0.7693 0.1937 0.6284 0.1411 0.5435 0.1094 0.4863 0.0965 0.4423 0.0810
0.9 0.8685 0.3212 0.6942 0.2053 0.5878 0.1563 0.5220 0.1276 0.4798 0.1183
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